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SPECTRUM POLICY REFORM AND THE NEXT
FRONTIER OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Philip J Weiser and Dale Hatfield"
INTRODUCTION
Wireless spectrum is hot property. In early 2008, a number of firms
bid almost $20 billion for the right to use 62 megahertz of spectrum in the
700 MHz band (which will be vacated by TV broadcasters after the transi-
tion to digital broadcasting).' During the debate over the rules for auction-
ing off this swath of spectrum, policymakers regularly emphasized that this
auction represented a unique opportunity for firms to gain access to spec-
trum. As the Washington Post reported, the spectrum licenses up for auc-
tion, "which are ideal for carrying wireless signals, are particularly valuable
because they will be the last up for auction for decades." 2
The scarcity of wireless spectrum reflects a costly failure of regulation.
In practice, large swaths of spectrum are vastly underused or used for low
value activities, but the regulatory system prevents innovative users from
gaining access to such spectrum.' In principle, therefore, the auction for
spectrum licenses in the 700 MHz band need not be the "final opportunity"
for enterprising firms to gain access to valuable spectrum. As a practical
matter, however, making spectrum available for more efficient uses re-
quires that Congress or the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
reform the system for managing rights to use the spectrum. Since the estab-
* Philip J. Weiser is a Professor of Law and Telecommunications at the University of Colorado.
Dale Hatfield is an Adjunct Professor of Telecommunications at the University of Colorado. We thank
Yochai Benkler, Brad Bernthal, Gerry Faulhaber, Ellen Goodman, Chuck Jackson, Jerry Kang, Mark
Lemley, Bob Matheson, Viva Moffat, John Murray, Neil Netanel, Jon Nuechterlein, Paul Ohm, Gideon
Parchomovsky, Howard Shelanski, Bryan Tramont, Polk Wagner, and Tim Wu for helpful comments
and encouragement. This paper also benefited from workshop presentations at the University of Virginia
School of Law seminar series, the University of Pennsylvania Ad Hoc Colloquium series, the UCLA
Law School Telecommunications Colloquium, the Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks Conference,
the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, and the Penn-Temple-Wharton Cyber-
Colloquium.
1 See 700MHz: 19. 1B and Counting, DAILYWIRELESS.ORG, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.dailywire
less.org/2008/02/07/700mhz- 191 b-and-counting/.
2 Kim Hart, FCC to Rule on Wireless Auction, WASH. POST, July 30,2007, at Al.
3 See GAO, STRONG SUPPORT FOR EXTENDING FCC's AUCTION AUTHORITY EXISTS, BUT LITrLE
AGREEMENT ON OTHER OPTIONS TO IMPROVE EFFICIENT USE OF SPECTRUM 13 (2005) ("[Dluring a
four-day period in New York City, only 13% of spectrum between 30 MHz and 2.9 GHz was occupied
at one time or another." (quoting MARK MCHENRY & DAN MCCLOSKEY, NEW YORK CITY SPECTRUM
OCCUPANCY MEASUREMENTS SEPTEMBER 2004 (2004))).
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lishment of that system during the New Deal, it has remained resistant to
reform.4
Commentators have recognized the need for reform, but the policy de-
bate has often gotten mired down in whether a "property rights"5 or a
"commons" model6 is the preferable regulatory strategy for managing ac-
cess to the radio spectrum.7 This debate, which is largely resolved in the
policy world in favor of a hybrid model (albeit with an emphasis on prop-
erty rights),8 has obscured the fact that advocates of property rights have
failed to articulate just how such a regime would work in practice. Rather,
they have largely concluded that since property rights work well for land,
they can work well for spectrum rights as well.9 But as we explain, spec-
trum is not the same as land, and a poorly designed property rights regime
4 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 530-31 (1998) [hereinafter Hazlett, As-
signing Property Rights]; Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase 's "Big Joke ": An Essay on Airwave
Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 336 (2001) [hereinafter Hazlett, Wireless Craze].
5 Technically speaking, the Communications Act does not allow any individual or firm to possess
a property right in radio spectrum. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); see also Note, Federal Control of Radio
Broadcasting, 39 YALE L.J. 244, 250 (1929) (stating that the premise that the "the government 'owns
the ether' ... was an idde fixe in the debates of Congress" over the Radio Act of 1927). Nonetheless, at
least in a few frequency bands, the FCC has moved to a "property rights-like" treatment of spectrum
licensees. See infra Part III.A. Although we will sometimes use the more precise phrase "property-like"
rights, we will often follow the precedent of using the less precise terms of "property rights," "property
rights advocates," or "property rights model."
6 Under the commons model, the FCC does not license access to the radio spectrum at all; in-
stead, it allows all comers to use spectrum subject to some technical requirements. In an earlier article,
we explained both the virtues of the commons model and what model of regulation was necessary to
ensure its effectiveness. See Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 663, 671 (2005).
7 Compare, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private
and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2007 (2003) (challenging the case for using commons spectrum
and advocating for private property model), with Yochai Bender, Some Economics of Wireless Commu-
nications, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2002) (making the case for commons spectrum). For an out-
standing overview of the competing reform proposals, see Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the
Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 269 (2004).
8 FCC, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT 3, ET Docket No. 02-135 (2002) [hereinafter
SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attach-
match/DOC-228542Al.doc (noting consensus of task force that the optimal strategy is a "balanced
spectrum policy that includes both the granting of exclusive spectrum usage rights through market-based
mechanisms and creating open access to spectrum 'commons,' with command-and-control regulation
used in limited circumstances").
9 E.g., Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important,
and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 19, 22 (2000) ("The real estate analogy, as well as the pre-
regulation experience, points strongly to the conclusion that a system of property rights in the radio
spectrum could resolve interference problems satisfactorily (in the same way that the owners of real
estate resolve their potential interference problems) while providing a far more flexible and responsive
mechanism for allocating spectrum to its most efficient uses.").
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for spectrum might even be worse than the legacy model of spectrum regu-
lation.
Under the legacy model of spectrum regulation, the FCC administers a
command-and-control model of regulation rooted in the Communications
Act of 1934. The essence of that model is that extensive regulation of the
"airwaves," or the radio spectrum ("spectrum"), is necessary to avoid inter-
ference between competing users. 10 As Justice Frankfurter concluded when
upholding the wide authority that the FCC has claimed in this area, "[t]he
facilities of radio [spectrum] are limited and therefore precious; they cannot
be left to wasteful use without detriment to the public interest."" Armed
with a broad mandate to regulate a "scarce resource," the FCC has largely
maintained the legacy model of regulation. As one 2002 FCC report put it,
"[u]ntil recently, spectrum policy at the administrative agency level, espe-
cially at the FCC, was generally formulated on a band-by-band, service-by-
service basis, typically in response to specific requests for particular service
allocations or station assignments."'
12
Over the last fifty years, beginning with Nobel Laureate Ronald
Coase's landmark criticism of spectrum regulation and call for tradable
property rights, commentators have increasingly criticized the legacy com-
mand-and-control model of regulation. 3 Thirty years after Coase's land-
mark work, the FCC took a notable step away from the legacy model by
experimenting with auctions for spectrum licenses (for "cellular"' 4 tele-
phone service). ' Ten years after those auctions, the FCC's Spectrum Policy
Task Force concluded that this model of regulation needed to be largely
replaced.' 6 Nonetheless, the FCC largely continues to adhere to the legacy
model of regulation and in 2007 closed a proceeding designed to create
property-like rights in spectrum. '" By so doing without acknowledging the
10 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 232 (2005).
11 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
12 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
13 See R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17-40 (1959).
14 The term "cellular" is a popular term and the one we will use in this paper. More precisely,
however, federal law categorizes cellular-as well as other bands used for cellular-like services (e.g.,
PCS, SMR)-as "commercial mobile services" ("CMS"). See 47 U.S.C. § 332(d) (2006). For simplicity
purposes, however, we use the familiar (and less technically precise) term.
15 The 1993 experiments with auctions became mandatory policy in 1997. See 47 U.S.C § 3090)
(2006) (delineating exceptions to auction requirement); Report and Order, Implementation of Sections
3090) and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934 as Amended, 15 F.C.C.R. 22,709 (Nov. 20, 2000).
For an explanation of the move to auctions, see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER supra note 10, at 242-51.
16 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 ("In many bands, spectrum
access is a more significant problem than physical scarcity of spectrum, in large part due to legacy
command-and-control regulation that limits the ability of potential spectrum users to obtain such ac-
cess.").
17 See Order, Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and Manage
Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile, and Satellite
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need for reform in this area, the agency effectively ignored the "increasing
dissatisfaction with the current approach to spectrum management which
suppresses competitive entry, blocks efficient transfer of spectrum to higher
value use, and insulates old technologies from innovative challenge."18
The lack of an active policy debate on how to design property rights in
spectrum is matched by a lack of debate in the scholarly literature. In the
scholarly arena, the lack of debate reflects both the preoccupation with the
merits or demerits of alternative models (i.e., command-and-control and
commons) as well as a consensus that developing and enforcing property
rights should be a reasonably simple task. After all, many commentators
argue, the legal system can enforce property rights in land-generally by
providing an injunction to remedy trespass-and should thus be capable of
enforcing property rights in spectrum using doctrines and institutions de-
veloped for that context."9 This conventional wisdom, as we explain,
glosses over the challenges of creating use rights for spectrum.2" Like ap-
plying the rules of real property to intellectual property, applying traditional
property rules to spectrum can lead to unfortunate results."' Thus, like the
case for defining property rights to use water, policymakers should embrace
a property rights system for spectrum more complex than the classic model
of trespass law developed for and employed in the context of real prop-
erty. 
22
Frequency Bands, ET Docket No. 03-237 (May 4, 2007) [hereinafter Interference Temperature Metric],
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-07-78A1 .pdf.
18 Patrick Xavier, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Secondary Markets For Spectrum: Policy
Issues 4 (2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/2/34758854.pdf.
19 Gerry Faulhaber, for example, concluded that:
While courts may have their own inefficiencies, the rest of the economy seems to work quite
well against the backdrop of the courts. If the property rights are written clearly and care-
fully, then the courts likely will be able to interpret them successfully, and furthermore, most
cases would be settled by negotiations if the rules are clear.
Gerald R. Faulhaber, Wireless Telecommunications: Spectrum as a Critical Resource, 79 S. CAL. L.
REv. 537, 558 (2006). To his credit, Professor Faulhaber noted in a footnote that:
Establishing clear, easy-to-verify-and-measure property rights is a very substantial task that
must be undertaken before a property regime is put into place. Current technical license limi-
tations are a starting point, but only that. Great care must be taken when casting rules that are
easy to interpret, measure, and enforce.
Id. at 558 n.123.
20 Another dissenting view from the conventional wisdom is presented in John W. Berresford &
Wayne Leighton, The Law of Property and the Law of Spectrum: A Critical Comparison, 13 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 35, 37 (2004) ("[M]uch as defining rights to land has not been simple, clarifying the rights
to spectrum will be a complex task.").
21 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REv. 173, 174 (2005) ("One error that the courts and Congress can fall into is moving too
quickly from the principles of physical property to those of intellectual property.").
22 For a discussion of the evolution of water rights, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommo-
dation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1529 (1989). Notably, even the development of the
rules for real property reflect more nuance than the seemingly straightforward rules of trespass law
would suggest. Not only does the law of nuisance provide an alternate model for protecting property-
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The challenge of developing a model of property rights for spectrum
centers around three central questions. First, policymakers must develop a
set of rights and remedies around spectrum property rights that reflect the
fact that radio signals defy boundaries and can propagate in unpredictable
ways. In particular, if policymakers simply created rights in spectrum and
enforced them like rights in land (i.e., with injunctions for trespass),23 they
would invite strategic behavior: spectrum speculators would buy licenses
for the sole purpose of suing other licensees when their transmission sys-
tems created interference outside the permissible boundary (i.e., act as
"spectrum trolls").24 To avoid this result, policymakers should develop a
property system that fits the technological realities of the radio spectrum
and should avoid providing a broad right to injunctive relief as traditionally
afforded by trespass law.25
The second principal question is whether to establish a unitary prop-
erty right for spectrum or whether to "zone" the spectrum by establishing
different levels of protection against interference (i.e., an ability to transmit
signals with more or less latitude) in different frequency bands. Despite the
considerable success of the use right established for cellular providers,26 we
do not embrace the selection of that model of interference protection for all
and a model more attuned to the nature of spectrum-but even real property law recognizes the need to
adapt to technological and market realities. See Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and
Intellectual Property, REGULATION, winter 2008, at 58, 60 (explaining that the traditional rules of
trespass "subject[] th[e] initial presumption [of absolute ownership and the right to an injunction] to
scrutiny in order to find those situations where the reconfiguration of rights [as in the case of water
rights, among others] will lead to overall social improvements, typically by increasing in high transac-
tion cost settings the value of property entitlements through the forced transformation of property
rights."); see also infra note 25.
23 Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719, 1732 (2004) ("In the law
of real property, trespassers face injunctions and often punitive damages as well.").
24 Spectrum trolls would be, in effect, a counterpart to the much-reviled "patent trolls" that do not
invent or market technology, but simply purchase patents to threaten or pursue litigation with the aim of
extracting royalty payments. See infra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
25 Notably, the traditional model of Blackacre (with an unmitigated right to exclude) is more of a
fiction than a reality-a point explained by Henry Smith with respect to the concept that "governance
rules" traditionally limit property law's "exclusion rules." As he explained:
Governance rules are used to loosen and moderate the exclusion rules in these contexts. Spe-
cial rules for airplane overflights, riparian rights to water, and parts of nuisance law are use
rules that serve to modify but not replace the basic exclusionary regime. As a result, the
common metaphor of property as a bundle of sticks is only partially apt: property is not built
up use by use, stick by stick. Building up packages of rights use by use is the election of an
expensive governance regime for all use conflicts. Rather, much property comes "pre-
bundled" so that many use conflicts can be decided based on who invaded whose rights, in
accord with the traditional lay view-an exclusion regime. As a matter of clear line-drawing
and information costs, some reliance on this approach is almost inevitable.
Henry Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 299 (2005) (citations omit-
ted). Along these lines, a pure exclusion regime is modified by innovations such as zoning codes, safe
harbors for particular conduct, and refined criteria for obtaining an injunction.
26 See infra Part III.A.
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frequency bands. Rather, we believe that multiple models of permissible
spectrum use will better serve society by both preserving socially valuable
uses of spectrum (such as AM radio) and allowing experimentation with
different types of technologies (e.g., higher powered versus lower powered
uses). Thus, under our proposed system, there would be a number of differ-
ent models for allowable spectrum use (applying in different bands) to pro-
vide a predictable basis for spectrum licensees to enjoy rights against inter-
ference and guide their operations to avoid causing harmful interference.
The final question for managing a system of spectrum property rights
is what institutional strategy will best facilitate the development of the
property right and its enforcement.27 As noted above, the FCC's record in
managing the spectrum is less-than-inspiring. Nonetheless, we conclude
that an administrative agency-be it a new one or a reformed FCC-is bet-
ter positioned than a court to develop and enforce the rules governing the
use of spectrum so as to facilitate technological progress and prevent parties
with antiquated equipment from objecting to more efficient uses of spec-
trum.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the basics of radio
technology, describes how spectrum policy has traditionally guarded
against interference between rival users of the radio spectrum, and high-
lights the principal weaknesses of the legacy model of regulation. In Part II,
we discuss the current debate on developing property rights for spectrum,
highlighting how it largely fails to consider the realities of how radio waves
operate. In particular, we use the case of AM radio to illustrate this point.
Based on this discussion, Part II demonstrates how predictive models-that
estimate interference statistically and probabilistically-will need to be the
starting point (and act as a safe harbor, at least for some time) for any sys-
tem of property rights in spectrum. Part III evaluates the challenges of de-
veloping an effective system for property rights in spectrum, including how
an after-the-fact enforcement process would complement a before-the-fact
zoning-like regime. Finally,.Part IV addresses a number of critical premises
for our regime, including why property rights in spectrum (as opposed to a
sole reliance on commons access) make sense, what institutional reforms
are necessary for an administrative agency like the FCC to implement an
effective spectrum management system, and what strategies can such an
agency use to encourage technological and economic progress.
27 To be clear, the three sets of issues noted above-those related to defining the use right, provid-
ing for different types of use rights, and adjudicating disputes between users-are not the only relevant
issues in managing property rights in spectrum. Notably, there are significant challenges in transitioning
from the current system to a new one, such as whether a windfall tax should be imposed on those firms
gaining additional flexibility under a property rights system and how to address government uses of
spectrum, which are managed under a command-and-control system. This Article, however, focuses on
the three questions outlined above, leaving those two sets of (and other spectrum policy) issues for
another day.
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I. THE RADIO SPECTRUM AND ITS REGULATION
Despite its economic significance, part of why spectrum regulation
remains an unfamiliar topic to most policymakers is that it is intangible and
difficult to conceptualize. The relative mystery of how wireless technology
operates, the general lack of awareness of how the current regulatory sys-
tem gives rise to long and costly delays in deploying new wireless tech-
nologies, and the challenges inherent in overcoming the inertia of a long
established policy largely explain the continuing dominance of the com-
mand-and-control model of spectrum management."8 Notably, these delays
and their associated constraints on technological dynamism harm consum-
ers-and often not today's incumbents-who generally do not realize what
they are missing. In the case of wireless telephone services, for example,
the loss from delays in the rollout of more and better services occasioned by
the legacy model of spectrum regulation was estimated in 1994 to be as
high as $33.5 billion dollars.2 9
To appreciate the imperative of spectrum policy reform, policymakers
(as well as scholars) must understand that radio spectrum is not mystical.
When radio technology is demystified, the FCC's role clearly does not
match the "wise man" vision of the New Deal; instead, its actions come
closer to those of many federal agencies skewered by the 1970s public
choice critique for protecting incumbents from competition. ° This protec-
tionism takes the form of a policy that purportedly guards against any pos-
sible interference to incumbent users by employing a command-and-control
system that places a series of critical decisions in the hands of the regula-
tor.3"
This Part will explain the legacy model of spectrum regulation and
highlight its fundamental flaws. In short, the legacy model of spectrum
regulation stands as a major obstacle to technical and economic progress in
three basic ways. First, as we explain in Part I.A, the traditional model of
spectrum management is premised on avoiding interference between differ-
ent users of spectrum at all costs, creating technical inefficiencies. Second,
as we explain in Part I.B, the traditional model of spectrum regulation re-
28 For an example of the type of delay typical under today's regime, see infra notes 92-97 (dis-
cussing Qualcomm's twenty month wait for a more flexible set of rules governing its licenses used for
broadcasting TV shows to cell phones).
29 Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS: 1997, at 1, 24 (1998).
30 Public choice theory is the modeling of politics as a strategic game in which all actors pursue
their economic objectives. On this theory, companies can be expected to pursue (or oppose) regulations
to protect (or gamer) "rents" for themselves. For a classic explanation of this theory and its implications,
see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873
(1987).
31 See infra Part I.B.
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stricts spectrum trading, resulting in economic inefficiencies. Third, as we
explain in Part I.B with reference to a recent decision involving Qualcomm,
the traditional model of spectrum regulation enables incumbent firms
skilled in the art of spectrum lobbying to use the system to their advantage,
creating political inefficiencies (increased lobbying costs) and inequities.
A. Spectrum Technology 101
For most Americans, the radio spectrum is an elusive concept. For
many years, scientists could not believe that "air" could conduct electric-
ity-think of Benjamin Franklin's experiments with lightning-and accord-
ingly assumed that a substance called "the ether" resided in the atmos-
phere.32 During the later years of the 1800s, scientists concluded otherwise,
defining some of the essential characteristics of how radio technology
works.33 In honor of one of these scientists, Heinrich Hertz, the defining
unit of the radio spectrum-the frequency of radio waves-is measured in
"Hertz" (or "Hz" for short).
In the years after the work of Hertz and others, inventors began to ex-
ploit the fact that, by modulating or changing the characteristics of a radio
wave of a given frequency, individuals could communicate information
over distances without wires or other physical media."4 In the case of analog
cellular services, for example, a frequency range (often called a "channel"
or, for larger ranges, a "band") of 30,000 Hz (or 30 kHz) can provide suffi-
cient bandwidth to establish a reliable communications link.35 Significantly,
one can use a particular 30 kHz channel to provide analog cellular service
on one day and then still have the same amount of radio spectrum available
for use on the next, meaning that spectrum is infinitely renewable.36 None-
theless, spectrum is still a scarce resource in the sense that two individuals
32 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 227.
33 HUGH G. J. AITKEN, SYNTONY AND SPARK: THE ORIGINS OF RADIO (1976).
34 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 228-29.
35 One kHz is one thousand Hz, one MHz is one million Hz, and one GHz is one billion Hz. Id. at
228.
36 Like air or water, however, the radio spectrum resource can be "polluted" by interference gen-
erated by natural sources of electromagnetic waves (e.g., lightning strikes) or by spurious emissions
from radio transmitters or other man-made devices (e.g., florescent lights). For a discussion of issues
surrounding viewing radio interference as pollution, see Goodman, supra note 7, at 398-401; see also J.
Pierre de Vries, Imagining Radio: Mental Models of Wireless Communication, in 2ND IEEE
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON NEW FRONTIERS IN DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS NETWORKS 372
(2007), available at http://www.pierredevries.com/docs/ImaginingRadioPID365685.pdf (exploring the
policy implications of the different mental models used in understanding spectrum, signals, and radios).
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cannot use the same frequency at the same time in the same place without
canceling out--or at least interfering with-both transmissions.37
The possibility of interference between two users operating at the
same frequency at the same time requires a little explanation about emerg-
ing technologies and the sophistication (or lack thereof) of radio receivers,
which is where interference occurs. At first blush, the nature of interference
may seem self-evident. But an unstated and sometimes inaccurate premise
is that the users of the same frequency band at the same time are using rea-
sonably cheap and dumb equipment.3" With the aid of a number of emerg-
ing "smart radio" technologies, users can avoid interference by, for exam-
ple, changing frequencies on a dynamic basis (in response to what frequen-
cies are being used at a particular time)." The limitation of such technolo-
gies, however, is that they are often expensive or unproven.4° Consequently,
for services such as AM radio (and its installed base of inexpensive equip-
ment), competing stations broadcasting at the same frequency at the same
time in the same location will cause interference insofar as the average re-
ceiver will be unable to decipher the two transmissions and will leave the
listener unable to listen to the programming of either station.4" As we dis-
cuss in Part IV, however, self-help measures may enable receivers to avoid
or minimize the threat of interference.
The term "the radio spectrum," while suggestive of radio broadcasting,
actually refers to the entire set of frequencies that are suitable for techni-
cally feasible uses of wireless communications. Such uses, and thus the
radio spectrum, have expanded over time. Because different bands within
the radio spectrum have different technical characteristics, some bands are
37 Goodman, supra note 7, at 285 ("Spectrum is simultaneously finite and renewable, everlasting
and degradable.").
38 As one observer explained:
The real culprits [for interference] are the speaker, car stereo, PC and other consumer elec-
tronics manufacturers for not designing their products to fend out this interference. With
proper metal enclosures for motherboards and for wires that connect into these electronic
components, the device can be shielded from picking up and amplifying stray radio fre-
quency.
The problem, of course, is that many of the components and the products themselves are
manufactured on the cheap overseas in places such as China and South Korea. And over the
past couple of decades consumers have grown accustomed to getting PCs and other con-
sumer electronics devices for bargain basement prices.
Marguerite Reardon, FAQ: The 411 on Radio Frequency Interference, CNET NEWS.COM, July 27, 2007,
http://news.com.com/FAQ+The+41 l+on+radio+frequency+interference/2100-1033_3-6199149.html.
39 SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 14 ("[Tjechnologies such as soft-
ware-defined radios are called 'smart' or 'opportunistic' technologies because, due to their operational
flexibility, software-defined radios can search the radio spectrum, sense the environment, and operate in
spectrum not in use by others.").
40 Goodman, supra note 7, at 382-83; see also, e.g., U.K. OFFICE OF COMMC'NS, OPEN SPECTRUM
UK RESPONSE TO OFCOM'S "SPECTRUM FRAMEWORK REVIEW" CONSULTATION 9 (2005), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/sfr/responses/openspectrum.pdf (calling such technologies
"high-risk/high-reward").
41 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 240.
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more attractive for particular purposes than others. The most notable uses of
spectrum (TV broadcasting, cellular telephone service, air-to-ground com-
munications) rely on the frequencies between 30 MHz and 3 GHz because
the physical dimensions of the antennas required for such transmissions are
reasonably sized, transmitting and receiving devices are low in cost, and
most fundamentally, the radio waves in such frequencies are less suscepti-
ble to being blocked or weakened by natural or manmade obstacles such as
hilly terrain or tall buildings.42
B. The Legacy Model of Regulation and Its Critics
The traditional command-and-control model of spectrum management
operates based on the "wise man" theory of regulation. Under this model,
the government (1) allocates spectrum for particular uses or services (such
as cellular telephone service, TV broadcasting, and air navigation systems);
(2) allots spectrum resources (e.g., channels) to particular localities and/or
particular types or classes of users within the particular allocations; (3) es-
tablishes technical and other service rules that apply to the service (e.g.,
maximum transmitter power limits); (4) grants licenses that assign users to
particular channels or groups of channels (e.g., through comparative hear-
ings or auctions); and (5) enforces usage rules through monitoring and other
enforcement activities. 3 In short, this approach generally presumes that
regulatory decisions, and not market forces, are "capable of deciding what
[uses of spectrum are] best for the public."'
The FCC's initial conception of interference between rival users justi-
fied its highly conservative system of allocating and assigning rights to use
spectrum.45 That conception predates the FCC's creation when a "chaos of
broadcasting" reportedly resulted from an absence of government oversight
of spectrum users.46 In essence, the FCC's early concern about interference
in the radio spectrum was that, without close government supervision, eve-
42 The range from 30 MHz to 3 GHz is a "sweet spot" that combines good propagation character-
istics, little interference from lightning and other atmospheric phenomena, and the ability to build low-
cost equipment. See generally LUCIEN BOITHIAS, RADIO WAVE PROPAGATION 310-11 (David Beeson
trans., McGraw-Hill 1987) (1984); JOSEPH J. CARR, PRACTICAL ANTENNA HANDBOOK 479 (2001); FCC
OFFICE OF ENG'G & TECH., BULL. No. 70, MILLIMETER WAVE PROPAGATION: SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 1 (1997); JERRY C. WHITAKER, THE RESOURCE HANDBOOK OF
ELECTRONICS 30 (2001).
43 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 232-39.
44 Douglas W. Webbink, Frequency Spectrum Deregulation Alternatives 10 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Working Paper, 1980), available at http:/www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp2
.pdf.
45 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 240.
46 For a discussion of both the incidence of amateur uses and widespread entry of radio stations,
see Coase, supra note 13, at 1-6.
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ryone would use the identical frequency at the same time in the same place
and no one would be heard as a result.47 Based on this fear, the FCC viewed
interference like a virus to be avoided-as opposed to a fact of life (like
different sources of light) that can be managed (say, by wearing sun-
glasses). As we will discuss below, this view continues to distort spectrum
policy decisions, leading to the underuse of a valuable resource."
The FCC's initial spectrum management regime adopted two basic
strategies for safeguarding against interference. First, it required a certain
amount of physical distance between stations operating at the same channel
(co-channels). Second, it relied on the use of "guard bands" between adja-
cent channels to prevent any possible interference.49 With respect to both
strategies, the FCC adopted a very conservative view about the actual ser-
vice area that should be within the scope of the license so as to protect
against co-channel interference." In particular, the FCC generally author-
ized blocks of spectrum-and assured against harmful interference-within
a predicted signal area." In the case of radio and later television broadcast-
ing, for example, the FCC licensed Grade B signal contours based on its
judgment about how signals would propagate in particular areas. 2 To make
this judgment, the FCC used a predictive mathematical model and relied on
a set of planning factors, such as the receiving antenna height and the ratio
of the signal strength from the desired (or primary) licensee to undesirable
ones (i.e., other transmissions). 3
Even today, the contours of a licensed Grade B signal are based on a
statistical judgment about the likely propagation of the relevant radio
transmissions. 4 The FCC defines the relevant boundary based on a statisti-
cal judgment about whether, in theory, the signal would reach 50% of the
locations at least 50% of the time.55 But rather than allow other licensees to
border the relevant contour (which would create the likelihood of interfer-
ence created by overlapping signals), the FCC leaves significant space (the
so-called "white space") between neighboring authorized users where spec-
47 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 232.
48 To give some credit to early U.S. policymakers, they did wisely reject the military's claim that
the only means of managing interference on the "airwaves" was to authorize a government monopoly on
spectrum. See Coase, supra note 13, at 3-4.
49 Hazlett, Wireless Craze, supra note 4, at 429.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217 (11 th Cir. 2001).
52 Steven J. Horvitz, Rate Regulation and Video Competition, 674 PLI/PAT 155, 230-31 (2001).
53 Id.
54 See generally Robert A. O'Connor, Understanding Television's Grade A and Grade B Service
Contours, 47 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON BROADCASTING 309 (2001).
55 Horvitz, supra note 52.
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trum remains unused to avoid any possible interference between neighbor-
ing licensees.56
To appreciate how the "virus view" of interference has impacted the
issue of adjacent channel inference, consider Figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Actual Signal Fit within a Single Channel
Output
Signal







In general, the FCC has evaluated how to authorize adjacent transmit-
ters for different radio channels based on the actual filters used by radio
transmitters.57 Reflecting this approach, the FCC has typically followed the
conservative virus view of interference meant to ensure that none of the
signal-even at a fairly low power--of the undesired transmission would
bleed into the adjacent channel. 8 Moreover, the FCC has traditionally
added an additional measure of conservatism when it develops its predictive
models using planning factors that assume technologically limited receivers
56 Over the years, the FCC has investigated opportunities to enable this spectrum to be used with-
out creating undue interference. In one famous case involving the authorization of low power FM sta-
tions, the incumbent broadcasters undermined the FCC's initiative. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra
note 10, 240-42. In another, which the FCC recently acted on, the agency suggested that wireless broad-
band operators would be permitted to use the spectrum authorized to TV broadcasters that is left unused.
Report and Order, Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 21 F.C.C.R. 12,266, 12,272,
12,277 (Oct. 18, 2006).
57 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 240.
58 Id.
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(and filters). 9 In short, on account of both of these considerations (i.e., pro-
tecting worst case transmitters and worst case receivers), along with the
political clout of incumbent broadcasters, the FCC has adhered to an "allo-
cations table" that widely spaces out authorized frequencies (i.e., both geo-
graphically and between channels in the same area). 60 For example, channel
21 would not be authorized in both Philadelphia and Baltimore, and chan-
nels 20 and 22 would not be authorized in Philadelphia if channel 21 was
authorized for use in Philadelphia.6
In short, a principal weakness of the traditional spectrum policy re-
gime is that it relies upon overly conservative and generally unrealistic pre-
dictive models of how radio waves propagate and how radio receiving sys-
tems operate (or could operate if proper incentives were applied), thereby
unduly restricting the development of new services and new entry. In par-
ticular, the legacy system is technically inefficient because it models the
transmission and reception of radio signals based on a set of unrealistic
planning factors. It ignores, for example, a number of limitations of the
primary licensee's service, including the level of sophistication and com-
plexity of the signal itself, the type of transmission equipment, and the rele-
vant receivers. 62 Again, these conservative estimates of the predicted signal
strength are in addition to spaced out allocations that protect incumbents
against the possibility of interference.63
In fairness to the traditional approach, some powerful reasons origi-
nally justified the conservative (and technically inefficient) model of spec-
trum management that characterizes the legacy command-and-control sys-
tem. First, unlike today when policymakers can model interference in very
sophisticated ways using computers, the early regulators had no such tools.
Second, to the extent that the FCC's primary goal was to prevent interfer-
ence at all costs, its approach made perfect sense, even if it sacrificed other
possible uses of spectrum. Third, the traditional willingness to sacrifice
more efficient uses of spectrum was far more tolerable when spectrum was
less valuable. Fourth, the scientific understanding of how radio signals
propagate and are measured has improved dramatically over the years.
Fifth, signal processing technology in receivers, which mitigates interfer-
ence and facilitates new uses of spectrum, is a relatively recent invention
and continues to become more economical. Finally, and given the afore-
mentioned reasons, the traditional emphasis on simplicity and front-end
59 id.
60 Id. at 23 9-40.
61 Cf Randy Hoffner, White Space Devices: Threat to Broadcast TV?, TV TECH., Dec. 5, 2007,
http://www.tvtechnology.com/pages/s.0079/t.10086.html ("As television engineers, most of us are well
familiar with the reasons that, for example, there is no NTSC television signal on Channel 4 in Philadel-
phia or in Hartford, Conn. The reason is these markets are too close to New York, Boston and Washing-
ton to avoid interfering with Channel 4 signals in those cities.").
62 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 240-41.
63 ld. at 239-41.
2008]
GEO. MASON L. REv.
protections over any back-end evaluation was a sound approach. But in
light of the increased demand for spectrum, particularly during the 1990s
once cellular telephony rose in popularity, policymakers began to realize
that they could no longer responsibly rely on the traditional approach and
needed to look for a more technically efficient model of spectrum regula-
tion.
From an economic perspective, the traditional approach always ap-
peared questionable. As noted above, Ronald Coase criticized the FCC's
legacy system of regulation, suggesting that it artificially restricted the pos-
sible uses of spectrum and invited the use of the regulatory process-
through claims about interference-to protect incumbents against entry
(i.e., rent-seeking). 64 Although Coase emphasized the economic inefficien-
cies inherent in this system, its political dynamics are also very problem-
atic. In particular, this system relies on arcane distinctions and an opaque
lobbying process mastered by incumbents and bewildering to entrants.65
Consequently, a transparent and across-the-board property rights model not
only provides greater economic efficiency, but also a fairer process of ac-
quiring rights to spectrum (i.e., one where all comers-and not exclusively
politically sophisticated parties-can succeed).66
Coase's critique of the legacy model of regulation anticipated and out-
lined the basic elements of what has since become known as the "Coase
Theorem" (i.e., that well-defined property rights and low transaction costs
allow parties to bargain to reach efficient outcomes). 67 Based on this
framework, Coase highlighted that the FCC left property rights (i.e., the
rules on interference) murky and created significant transaction costs for the
trading of spectrum rights, thereby undermining economic efficiency
goals. 68 In particular, he explained that the FCC's regulatory system en-
sured that certain lower value uses of spectrum (such as today's UHF tele-
64 See Coase, supra note 13, at 17-40.
65 As Thomas Hazlett has emphasized, this dynamic emerged not long after the command-and-
control regulatory regime was put in place. See Hazlett, Wireless Craze, supra note 4, at 372 ("Probably
no quasi-judicial body was ever subject to so much Congressional pressure as the Federal Radio Com-
mission." (quoting LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION 55 (Brookings
Institution 1932))).
66 Jim Snider explained this point:
The complexity of the current system militates against public involvement .... The result is
that band-by-band rulemaking is synonymous with special interest politics, with politically
powerful incumbent licensees making out like bandits. By creating fewer different types of
bands, changes to any one band are more important and thus can draw the interest of a larger
fraction of the public.
J.H. Snider, The Art of Spectrum Lobbying 37 (New America Foundation, Working Paper No. 19,
2007), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaperl9 SpectrumGiveawaySnider.pdf.
67 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960).
68 Coase, supra note 13, at 27 n.54.
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vision broadcasting) could not give way to other higher value uses (such as
today's cellular telephone service).69
Coase's fundamental premise was that the FCC should define property
rights in spectrum licenses and allow for the free trading of those rights.7°
Under such a system, Coase explained, the equilibrium would not likely be
one with no threat of interference, directly challenging the FCC's virus view
of interference. 7' Rather, in Coase's view, spectrum regulation should seek
to ensure that "the gain from [allowing additional] interference more than
offsets the harm it produces."" As Coase concluded, in an undeniable un-
derstatement, "[t]here is no reason to support that the optimum situation is
one in which there is no interference."73 To further underscore this basic
point, Coase later commented about pollution: "I am sure that pollution
exists, I know that much; what I do not know is whether we have enough of
it."74 In short, Coase highlighted that interference (like pollution) is a by-
product of a socially valuable endeavor (radio communications) that should
be tolerated except insofar as reasonable mitigation measures are available
(but not being used) or the costs of the harmful activity outstrip the social
benefits occasioned by the valuable endeavor. 7"
Despite Coase's and other economists' withering criticism of the
FCC's legacy model of spectrum regulation, the FCC rarely departed from
its traditional command-and-control approach to spectrum management
before the 1990s.76 In part, its traditional regulatory strategy reflected mis-
69 Id. This is hardly a hypothetical trade. Not only do the bands now used for UHF broadcasting
represent spectrum that could be used effectively for other forms of wireless communications, a 1992
study suggested that lifting the use restriction that prevents TV stations from selling their spectrum for
use in wireless communications would have produced a net social gain-in the Los Angeles market
alone-of over $1 billion from 1992 to 2000. See Evan R. Kwerel & John R. Williams, Changing
Channels: Voluntary Reallocation of the UHF Telecommunications Spectrum vii, 100 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 27, 1992), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/OPP/workingpapers/oppwp27.pdf. The actual amount of social gain that would have emerged
from such a trade is lower than the $1 billion figure because the FCC authorized a number of other
entrants into the cellular telephone market whereas the calculations of the 1992 study assumed no addi-
tional entry. Id. at vii.
70 Coase, supra note 13, at 30.
71 Id. at 25, 27.
72 Id. at 27.
73 Id,
74 This quote comes from Professor Bruce Lehman, a former student of Ronald Coase and cur-
rently a professor at the University of California, San Diego. He quoted Coase as making this statement
in a presentation at the Business Method Patents and Financial Services conference organized by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in April of 2003. The conference program is available at http://www.
frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=A6BDAC9C-384A-4C59-9096A079D324A9B7&method=display.
We thank Gideon Parchomovsky for bringing this quote to our attention.
75 See Coase, supra note 13, at 28-29.
76 For an exemplary critique of the FCC's traditional approach, see Gerald R. Faulhaber & David
J. Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Spectrum, and the Commons (AEI-Brookings Joint
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taken and often ultraconservative views about the nature of interference
between different users (and uses) of spectrum. More often than not, how-
ever, these restrictions simply reflected the confluence of interests between
regulators-who valued their role as wise men (or wise women)-and the
ability of politically powerful incumbent licensees to use the regulatory
process to limit competition.77 Unfortunately, the FCC's deference to in-
cumbents undoubtedly left consumers worse off, because even though "en-
try that generates interference damage exceeding consumer gains is ineffi-
cient, established interests reliably oppose both inefficient and efficient
entry. 78
With the explosion of wireless services in the 1990s and the increased
demand for spectrum, policymakers began to face what some have called a
"spectrum drought."79 As policymakers have realized, however, this
drought is solvable. To do so, the FCC has begun to question the virus view
of interference, to evaluate how technology had upended some of its poli-
cies, and to reform some of its policies accordingly.8" Consequently, poli-
cymakers are growing increasingly skeptical of the classic "wise man" re-
strictions on spectrum use.8'
As the Spectrum Policy Task Force Report ("Report") explained, the
key failing of spectrum policy is not the scarcity of available spectrum per
se, but rather that administrative rigidities prevent more efficient use of this
unique resource. 2 In its Report, the Task Force concluded that "[t]o in-
crease opportunities for technologically innovative and economically effi-
cient spectrum use, spectrum policy must evolve towards more flexible and
market-oriented regulatory models." 3 As Chairman Powell explained upon
Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 02-12, 2002), available at http://l00xl00network.org/
papers/faulhaber-brookings2002.pdf.
77 For the classic explanation of this dynamic, see Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22 (1971).
78 Thomas W. Hazlett, Liberalizing US Spectrum Allocation, 27 TELECOMMS. POL'Y 485, 487
(2003).
79 See Policy Statement, Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Development
of Telecommunications Technologies for the New Millennium, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,868, para. 2 (Nov. 22,
1999) (recognizing "increased demand for a finite supply of spectrum").
80 In one proceeding, for example, the FCC concluded that "the benefits of adding new services or
capabilities to a frequency band" outweighed "the relatively small" possible harms to the incumbent
service. Report and Order, Amendment of Part 2 and 25 of the Commission's Rules to Permit Operation
of NGSO FSS Systems Co-Frequency with GSO and Terrestrial Systems in the Ku-Band Frequency
Range, 17 F.C.C.R. 9614, para. 32 (May 23, 2002).
81 Consider, for example, Commissioner Adelstein's call for regulators to use "a light touch and a
sense of humility" in developing rules that restrict uses of the spectrum. Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r,
Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, New Frontiers in Wireless Policy: A Framework for Innovation, Remarks to
the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program, University of Colorado at Boulder 3 (Apr. 9, 2003)
(transcript available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-233139A1 .pdf).
82 SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3, 14-15.
83 Id. at 3.
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releasing the report, innovative services are often "inhibited by the 'mother
may I' phenomenon-businesses must go to the FCC for permission before
they can modify their spectrum plans to respond to consumer demand. 's4 In
short, the FCC's expansive authority over spectrum is increasingly prob-
lematic; after all, "[a]s the variety of spectrum uses and associated tech-
nologies change and spectrum demand expands, the difficulties [in effec-
tively managing such a system] compound.
85
Since the Report, the FCC has shown little initiative in confronting
some of the more challenging aspects of creating property rights in spec-
trum.86 In particular, the Report's effort to define the contours of "harmful
interference"8 through a measurement-based system-which it styled as an
"interference temperature"18-fell into a regulatory abyss. 89 Consequently,
firms developing new wireless technologies must continue to ask the FCC
for permission to modify the existing heavily prescribed limitations set
forth in the relevant service rules.90 Moreover, the FCC continues to pre-
84 Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Broadband Migration III: New Direc-
tions in Wireless Policy 4-5 (Oct. 30, 2002) (transcript available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-227944A1 .pdf).
85 See Xavier, supra note 18, at 11.
86 The notable exception is its secondary markets initiative. See Report and Order, Promoting
Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets,
18 F.C.C.R. 20,604, 20,607 (Oct. 6, 2003).
87 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 27-30. The FCC defines "harm-
ful interference" as "[i]nterference which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of
other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication
service operating in accordance with [international] Radio Regulations." 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2006). This
standard leaves the FCC with significant discretion, and the FCC has yet to develop a more precise
definition of the concept. For an excellent discussion of the importance of and challenges inherent in
doing so, see R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getting Better Reception from the FCC's Spec-
trum Policy, 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 5, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/03_ STLR 5/arti-
clepdf.pdf.
88 See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 27; see also Notice of Inquiry
and Proposed Rulemaking, Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify and Man-
age Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile and Satellite
Frequency Bands, 18 F.C.C.R. 25,309 (Nov. 28, 2003).
89 In 2007, the FCC acknowledged as much, terminating the proceeding. See Interference Tem-
perature Metric, supra note 17.
90 As the GAO reported:
[F]or most frequency bands [the] FCC allocates, the agency issues service rules to define the
terms and conditions for spectrum use within the given bands. These rules typically specify
eligibility standards as well as limitations on the services that the relevant entities may offer
and the technologies and power levels they may use. These decisions can constrain users'
ability to offer services and equipment of their choosing.
JAYETrA Z. HECKER, GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR AND BARRIERS TO SPECTRUM
REFORM 7. (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06526t.pdf.
GEO. MASON L. REv.
scribe command-and-control measures that specify technologies (as op-
posed to focusing on outcomes).91
To appreciate the state of spectrum regulation and its attendant eco-
nomic effects, consider the case of Qualcomm's MediaFLO product. Me-
diaFLO, as planned by Qualcomm, will provide mobile video delivery to
cellular phones via spectrum that Qualcomm purchased at an auction.9"
When evaluating its new service, Qualcomm determined that the service
might create interference with adjacent services,9 3 but, on account of the
legacy treatment of interference management, it had no clear guidance as to
what principles would govern such interference. To address this issue, it
petitioned the FCC for guidance.94
Over twenty months after filing its initial petition, Qualcomm-with
its army of lawyers and lobbyists-finally received a decision detailing the
basic rules governing the permissible uses of its license.95 In its decision,
the FCC considered embracing a more systematic (and less ad hoc) stan-
dard for interference management on similar issues as well as instituting a
streamlined procedure for determining issues like that raised by Qual-
comm. 96 Ultimately, however, the FCC declined to do either, instead adher-
ing to its usual public interest, case-by-case determination system97 that
invites rent-seeking (i.e., delay-inducing) behavior by competitors.9" By so
doing, the FCC left in place its process of public interest balancing and
wide discretionary judgments that creates, as Thomas Hazlett put it, "a
moral hazard for incumbents who are rewarded for raising interference
complaints simply to block competition."99 In his earlier call for a funda-
91 Consider, for example, the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the 2155-2175 MHz
band where it suggests that the agency might specify particular types of technological limitations for
that band-that is, how uplink and downlink transmissions could be used. See Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 2155-2175 MHz Band, 22 F.C.C.R.
17,035, 17,042-48 (Sept. 19, 2007).
92 Qualcomm Incorporated Petition for Declaratory Ruling, 21 F.C.C.R. 11,683, 11,684 (Oct. 13,
2006) (report & order). Qualcomm planned to offer between 50 and 100 local and national channels
either in real time or in clip-casting for later viewing. Id.
93 See id. at 11,685.
94 Seeid. atll,683.
95 See id.
96 Id. at 11,696-97, 11,699.
9' id. at 11,696, 11,700-01.
98 See Hazlett, Wireless Craze, supra note 4, at 386-91.
99 Hazlett, supra note 78, at 486 (2003); see also note 56, supra (discussing the low power FM
saga). Hazlett takes his argument one step further, arguing not only that FCC decision-making gates new
entry, but also that it serves as a disciplining force so that all existing incumbents abide by an agreement
not to create more competition against one another (say, by leasing available spectrum). Hazlett, supra
note 78, at 488. In effect, Hazlett maintains that the FCC's implicit protection of an incumbents' cartel
continues what, less than twenty years ago, was explicit policy. See Carroll Broad. Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d
440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (holding that additional stations should not be assigned if they could endanger
the vitality of current ones); Report and Order, Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New
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mental reform of the FCC's spectrum management process, Chairman
Powell recognized this very point, underscoring the need for the agency to
move away from interference management approaches that constitute "bar-
riers to entry, that assume a particular proponent's business model or tech-
nology, and that take the place of marketplace or technical solutions."' 0
At present, the regulatory strategy for guarding against interference is
notoriously undefined, moves too slowly to offer effective guidance, raises
transaction costs (as well as entry barriers), and leads to the underuse of
spectrum. The logjam that the current system creates on the front end (in
terms of the need for requests like that filed by Qualcomm) relates closely
to the fact that the system provides insufficient back-end regulatory over-
sight or attention to actual consequences. To be sure, the FCC has encour-
aged more flexible uses of spectrum,'' but most firms are not as well-
heeled or politically effective as Qualcomm in pressing their case to reform
the front-end protections.
In fairness to the FCC, the agency may view itself in a catch-22 sce-
nario insofar as it is ill equipped to handle the increasing number of dis-
putes over spectrum usage that would arise should it allow increased flexi-
bility and address complaints after actual reports of interference. 1 2 This
limitation, however, only underscores the need to make fundamental re-
forms as part of implementing a more flexible spectrum policy. After all,
the legacy model of spectrum regulation was designed in a world where
minimizing the hint of interference was the paramount policy goal. Not
surprisingly, this model disserves today's goal of creating more opportuni-
ties to use spectrum-even though achieving that goal also means creating
a greater likelihood of interference and a need to deal with it.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPECTRUM
Under the classic notion of property, an owner possesses "a bundle of
distinctive rights,"'0 3 the essence of which is the right to exclude others. "0
Broadcasting Stations on Existing Stations, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, 638 (Feb. 11, 1988) (abolishing Carroll
doctrine).
100 Powell, supra note 84, at 8.
101 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 244-45.
102 For another example of an interference dispute related to ill-defined and administered rules, see
Jeffrey Silva, Sirius Operating out of Bounds, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.rcr
news.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061030/SUB/610300736/1005/FREE.
103 Glen 0. Robinson, Spectrum Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609,609 (1998).
104 E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("In this case, we hold that the
'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this
category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation."); Richard A. Epstein,
Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 22 (1997)
("[I]t is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to exclude is rejected.").
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Following from this principle, the quintessential protection of both real
property and intellectual property law is an action for trespass (or infringe-
ment in the case of intellectual property) to prevent or redress the use of
property without the owner's consent. Along with damages, the remedy for
trespass or infringement is generally an injunction to prevent the illegal
conduct from occurring or reoccurring.'05
In the wake of Coase's landmark work, a number of commentators
sought to develop the particulars of how to "propertize" the radio spectrum.
One notable early such effort was led by Arthur De Vany, who worked with
an interdisciplinary team in the late 1960s. 106 More recently, others have
amplified and reinforced the argument for property rights in spectrum.'07 In
much of this work, as Part II.A explains, commentators have often sug-
gested that spectrum can be subject to property rights along the lines used
for real estate.'08 In so doing, as Part II.B explains, they have ignored,
downplayed, or deferred addressing the realities of radio propagation and
how they relate to the definition and enforcement of property rights in spec-
trum. As Part II.C illustrates with respect to AM radio, any realistic regime
for managing property rights in spectrum must (as Part II.D underscores)
recognize the critical role played by predictive models in regulating spec-
trum use.
105 In the intellectual property context, injunctive relief is generally the available and appropriate
remedy, but the state of the law in this area remains controversial. Compare eBay v. MercExchange, 126
S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that injunctions are the traditional
remedy in patent cases because of valuation concerns), with id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that certain cases are not well-suited to injunctive relief).
106 Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic
Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969).
107 See, e.g., Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights, supra note 4; Hazlett, Wireless Craze, supra note
4; Jora R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Alloca-
tion, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221 (1975); Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spec-
trum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L. J. 87 (1997); Howard A. Shelanski &
Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 581
(1998); Douglas W. Webbink, Radio Licenses and Frequency Spectrum Use Property Rights, 9 COMm.
& L. 3 (1987); Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 76; Milton Mueller, Property Rights in Radio Communi-
cation: The Key to the Reform of Telecommunications Regulation (Cato Policy Analysis No. 11, 1982),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa011 .html.
108 See, e.g., White, supra note 9, at 22 ("The real estate analogy, as well as the pre-regulation
experience, points strongly to the conclusion that a system of property rights in the radio spectrum could
resolve interference problems satisfactorily (in the same way that the owners of real estate resolve their
potential interference problems) while providing a far more flexible and responsive mechanism for
allocating spectrum to its most efficient uses.").
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A. Academic Proposals for Spectrum Property Rights
In their classic 1969 work, De Vany and his coauthors recognized the
importance of-and the formidable technical obstacles to-establishing
unambiguous and enforceable rights in the radio spectrum. Ultimately, the
De Vany study proposed a multidimensional set of rights based upon time,
geographic area, and spectrum (band) ("TAS" for short)."9 As they saw it,
the owner of the TAS-based rights would have the exclusive right to pro-
duce (information-bearing) radio waves for a specified period of time (T),
over a specified geographic area (A) and in a specified range of frequencies
(S). " Moreover, they maintained, this system would enable spectrum li-
censees to trade their licenses and to use them however they chose, thereby
giving rise to the more efficient uses of spectrum advocated by Coase in his
landmark paper. "'
The De Vany study recognized that the exclusive possession of spec-
trum along the TAS dimensions would pose notable technical challenges.
Fundamentally, De Vany and his coauthors recognized that radio signals do
not respect the time, area, and spectrum boundaries related to the TAS-
based spectrum-use rights."2 In particular, as discussed below, preventing a
radio signal from "trespassing" into a neighboring geographic area or adja-
cent band is much harder than keeping a person or object from entering
onto a particular piece of real property. To be sure, it is physically possible
for noise and pollution to trespass onto real property, but that possibility
does not complicate the effort to set the actual boundaries of such property
(as is the case with defining property rights in spectrum). We shall discuss
each in turn.
1. Geographic Spillover Issues
The basic problem with geographic boundaries is easy to understand
because it stems from the simple and easily observable fact that radio waves
propagate in an unpredictable manner. Notably, radio waves emanate from
a transmitter antenna and, while they get steadily weaker with distance,
they do not respect or automatically stop at preset borders." 3 Consequently,
at the border between one defined geographic area and another, one spec-
trum licensee's signal inevitably encroaches on another's. The traditional
109 De Vany, supra note 106, at 1501.
110 Id. at 1512-17. The terms frequency and spectrum are sometimes used interchangeably. Here
"S" refers to the frequency dimension of the spectrum resource, not the resource more generally. Id. at
1501.
111 Seeid. atl517.
112 Id. at 1519-27.
113 Id. at 1503.
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response to this phenomenon (still widely used today) is for the FCC to
control the characteristics and locations of the transmitter systems so that
the weakening of radio waves over a particular distance guards against (or
at least limits) the interference within the respective service areas of the two
transmitters." 4 Such command-and-control restrictions on the placement or
types of transmitters are, however, antithetical to a flexible, market-based
approach.
To address the wide variability associated with radio propagation, the
De Vany study proposed rules that would limit the maximum strength of
the signal at the geographic boundary." 5 Under this approach, the owners of
the spectrum-use rights in neighboring regions would be protected against
interfering signals from surrounding areas at a level greater than the defined
limit." 6 The De Vany approach also called for similar constraints as to the
time and spectrum/frequency dimensions. " 7
When outlining his proposal, De Vany called for a fundamental reori-
entation of spectrum policy. In particular, De Vany called for a shift from
prescribing how firms can operate (e.g., individual transmitter locations,
power levels, and antenna heights) to focusing only on the desired result
(e.g., a limited signal strength at the boundary). For example, as long as the
out-of-area emission restriction is obeyed, the holder of the spectrum-use
right under De Vany's framework could choose, without FCC oversight (or
permission), to deploy a high power, wide coverage system; a low power,
"cellularized" system with multiple transmitters and low antenna heights; or
an "infrastructureless" system employing mesh network technology.
By developing a thoughtful proposal for spectrum property rights, the
De Vany team transformed the debate over spectrum policy reform. Con-
sider, for example, how Lawrence White outlined the parameters of an ideal
system of property rights in spectrum:
The property right to use the spectrum should be defined in terms of a specified spectrum
frequency band, a specified geographic area, and a specified time period. The property right
(in perpetuity) would be expressed as the right to transmit over the specified spectrum [fre-
quency] band, so long as the signals do not exceed a specified strength (expressed in
volts/meter) beyond the specified geographic boundaries during the specified time period
(which would be the full 8,760 hours in a year or any sub-division of those 8,760 hours). 118
114 Note that, as we will describe below, the signal strength in the real world does not always drop
off monotonically.
115 De Vany, supra note 106, at 1513-14.
116 Id. at 1513.
117 Id. at 1512, 1515-16.
118 White, supra note 9, at 29-30. Notably, White uses the phrase "propertyzed" as opposed to
"privatized" because, as he explains, the government may still own substantial amounts of spectrum for
their own internal uses (e.g., national defense and homeland security) under a property rights regime. Id.
at 31.
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In setting forth his proposal, White develops a number of useful rec-
ommendations for the future role of the federal government under a re-
formed spectrum policy regime, including acting as a registrar of spectrum
holdings, an owner of some of the rights, and the administrative agency
responsible for resolving widespread instances of interference where private
enforcement is impractical because of transaction costs." 9 White does not,
however, grapple with any of the implications of the often highly variable
nature of radio propagation and radio system performance discussed in Part
II.A.2. Most fundamentally, White assumes that, without questioning
whether, the dimensions used by De Vany (and set forth in his proposal)
will be reliable in the same sense as those used by real property law. 
20
In another important study on spectrum property rights, Kwerel and
Williams also adopt the essential elements of the De Vany framework, but
they discuss in some detail the interference issues in both the space and
frequency dimensions.'12 With regard to these dimensions and to allow
maximum flexibility, Kwerel and Williams follow the De Vany precedent
of proposing objective limits on the amount of signal power that can spill-
over into adjacent frequency bands and into adjacent geographic areas.
More specifically, they suggest that this proposal follows from the success
of the regulatory strategy used for controlling out-of-area and out-of-band
emissions in the bands reserved for the cellular services. 
22
2. Adjacent Channel Spillover
In their paper, Kwerel and Williams acknowledge not only the possi-
bility of interference between services operating in the same band in adja-
cent geographic areas, but also between adjacent channels in the same geo-
graphic area.'23 This adjacent band problem underscores that interference is
not a natural phenomenon-radio waves do not collide in a destructive
fashion-but rather one that manifests itself in receivers. 124 Thus, interfer-
ence can result from: (1) a transmitter emitting radio energy outside the
licensee's assigned bandwidth and into an adjacent band; (2) a receiver that
inadequately filters out the energy in an adjacent band even when the
transmitter in that adjacent band emits without spilling over; or (3) a com-
bination of the two. 125 Depending upon the characteristics of transmitters
119 ldat32.
120 See id. at 29-30.
121 See Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of
Spectrum iv-v (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, OSP Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 38, 2002),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-228552A1 .pdf.
122 See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
123 Kwerel & Williams, supra note 121, at 44.
124 See id. at 45-46.
125 Id. at44.
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and receivers, adjacent channel interference can even extend beyond imme-
diately adjacent channels.'26
Adjacent channel spillover problems are pervasive in spectrum use
and, unlike the typical approach in real property, part of the solution may be
for the "victim" of a "trespass" to change his or her use of the property.'27
Consider a scenario in which a receiver attempts to receive a very weak
(e.g., very distant) in-band signal. In that case, a high-powered use (e.g.,
broadcast television) in an adjacent band is likely to create a spillover prob-
lem. 28 Interference in the frequency dimension can be controlled either by
controlling the power of the transmitter or by requiring better filters and
other techniques on the part of the receiver in the adjacent band.'29 Notably,
an important benefit that emerges as a result of using more selective receiv-
ers (and a lower powered transmitter) in lieu of previously used ineffective
receivers is that users of adjacent bands have greater protection against in-
terference resulting from the use of a higher powered transmitter. The chal-
lenges of addressing this issue are that any solution will impose real costs
on the parties-particularly when very high powered or small, portable
devices are involved' 3°-and that, unlike the case of land, no natural de-
marcation exists where one spectrum user's transmission power "tres-
passes" on the adjacent channel user's receiver sensitivity.
As Kwerel and Williams see it, the adjacent channel issue warrants a
regulatory safeguard. In particular, they suggest the need for rules that
would "rule out extreme power levels [that exacerbate the problem receiv-
ers have with rejecting very strong adjacent signals at reasonable cost] that
have little practical benefit but, which, if left unchecked, could lead to ex-
cessive interference risk and harmful strategic behavior."'' Despite the
appearance of embracing a command-and-control-type rule (like the service
rules generally eschewed by property rights advocates), Kwerel and Wil-
liams suggest (apropos of the Coase Theorem) that such a default rule can
126 Szu-wei Wang & Stephen S. Rappaport, Balanced Channel Assignment Patterns for Cellular
Communications Systems, 1 IEEE INT'L. CONF. ON COMM. 452, 455-56 (1988) (distinguishing between
immediately adjacent and not immediately adjacent channel interference).
127 We say "typical" because there are exceptions where the law withholds protection from prop-
erty owners under certain conditions, in effect requiring them to protect themselves. See, e.g., LeRoy
Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 353 (1914) (Holmes, J., concurring)
(suggesting a rule of tort law that, although recognizing the right of a farmer "to put his flax where he
liked upon his own land, the liability of the railroad for a fire [should be] absolutely conditioned upon
the stacks being at a reasonably safe distance from the train").
128 Kwerel & Williams, supra note 121, at 46.
129 id.
130 The impact of receivers is particularly noteworthy with respect to the decisions made related to
the UHF band, where the presence of inexpensive and relatively unsophisticated receivers are used to
justify wide spacing requirements between the different channels.
131 Kwerel & Williams, supra note 121, at 46. By "strategic behavior," the authors are referring to
actions designed to optimize results favorable to a particular party even if those actions risk hurting
others and may well undermine overall social welfare.
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be relatively crude because different licensees can successfully renegotiate
the applicable limits. 3 2 Reflecting their faith that such Coasian bargains
will take place, Kwerel and Williams conclude that the government need
not recommend minimum receiver performance standards except in excep-
tional circumstances.' 33
The final, and most significant, development since the De Vany-led
study is a 2005 paper by Robert Matheson. This paper presents the most
complete analysis of property rights in radio spectrum as well as the fullest
discussion of the practical challenges and limitations of actually employing
such rights in the management of the resource.'34 Whereas De Vany et al.
set forth a proposal based upon four dimensions (time, two dimensions of
geographic location (latitude and longitude), and frequency), Matheson
proposes a regime based upon seven dimensions. '5 To minimize confusion
with the term "spectrum" (which normally only refers to the frequency di-
mension), Matheson calls his seven dimension model "electrospace."' 36
Under Matheson's proposal, the seven dimensions of electrospace in-
clude frequency, the three dimensions of location (latitude, longitude, and
elevation), time, and the two possible directions of arrival (azimuth and
elevation angles).'37 By adding altitude as a dimension, Matheson. envisions
that a holder of spectrum-use rights might choose to sell or lease "air
rights" above a ground-based system. " As for the addition of direction of
arrival, Matheson premises that dimension on the fact that a receiver can
discriminate between radio waves arriving from different directions."' By
using directive antennas, a receiving system can gather a greater amount of
energy from a signal arriving from one direction while minimizing or
132 Id. at47.
133 Id. 46-47. In Coase's classic article, and in anticipation of the insights of his later Nobel Prize-
wining work, he suggested that a "nuisance" was a legal construct and that, except if transaction costs
were significant, neighbors-such as a doctor and confectioner-should be able to agree on safeguards
to optimize both of their uses of their property. Coase, supra note 13, at 27, 29. In the case of a doctor
and a confectioner case operating next to one another, for example, it might be efficient for the confec-
tioner to pay for insulation so as to protect the doctor from any noise made by the confectioner. Id. at
26-27. Similarly, there may well be a number of cases where neighboring spectrum owners can agree on
such win-win agreements. Id. at 27-28. In other cases, however, the coordination and possible relocation
costs-or other transaction costs (such as developing clear legal entitlements)-may be too formidable
to be addressed through private market arrangements. See id. at 29. For a recent case where the FCC
stepped in to coordinate a relocation of a set of incumbent licensees to avoid adjacent channel interfer-
ence, see Report and Order, Improving Public Safety in the 800 MHz Band, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,818 (Oct.
29, 2004).
134 See Robert J. Matheson, Principles of Flexible Spectrum Use Rights, 8 J. CoMMC'NS &
NETWORKS 144 (2006).
135 Id. at 145.
136 Id. at 144.
137 Id. at 145.
138 See id. at 147.
139 Id.
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"nulling out" the energy of an otherwise interfering signal arriving from a
different direction. 140
Like other proponents of spectrum property rights, Matheson empha-
sizes the importance of allowing technological flexibility in, and the free
trading of, spectrum rights. Matheson suggests that the holders of spectrum-
use rights should be free to divide or aggregate spectrum along any of the
electrospace dimensions. 41 By adding complexity, however, Matheson
develops a more sophisticated and realistic model that also raises new diffi-
culties. Building antennas that focus all of the transmitted energy in a single
direction is just as effective as building transmitters that confine all of the
transmitted energy to one frequency range or channel. Consequently, by
recognizing rights against (and in protection of) the direction of arrival,
Matheson begs the question of how that measure could be enforced effec-
tively.
As to the adjacent channel interference issue, Matheson refines Kwerel
and Williams' approach of specifying a maximum power level to avoid
adjacent channel interference. In his view, the power impinging upon the
receiving system is the critical issue; thus, he suggests, regulating the actual
power level received at ground level or a specified location (as opposed to
at the transmitter) is the better approach. ' As he explains, this method
would regulate results and not how firms operate, thereby giving the spec-
trum licensee greater flexibility in how to meet the relevant constraint while
still offering protection to the receivers at risk of interference. 143
Unlike earlier proponents of the property rights approach, Matheson
appreciates many of the difficulties and implications of defining exactly
how the rights are to be specified. Notably, Matheson realizes that setting
limits on the spillover outside each of the electrospace dimensions and on
the maximum power levels that can be used inside those dimensions is
much more difficult and costly than policing trespass to land. He explains,
for example, that a very stringent limit on the spillover effects into an adja-
cent geographic area may force the rights-holder to reduce power such that
significant "holes" in coverage are produced near the boundary.'" To be
sure, as we discuss below, a stringent limit may force the rights-holder to
select a cellular architecture with multiple low-powered, low antenna-
height sites to control the spillover and still provide the necessary cover-
age. '45 By contrast, a very generous limit on spillover into adjacent geo-
graphic areas would impose costs on the rights-holder across the boundary
140 See Matheson, supra note 134, at 147.
141 Id. at 148.
142 id.
143 id.
144 See id. at 146 (discussing the need to reduce signal strength in certain areas).
145 See infra pp. 592-93.
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and would require it to adopt more expensive interference mitigation tech-
niques. '46
Of all commentators since De Vany, Matheson makes a particularly
important contribution by highlighting how choices about maximum power
levels do not lend themselves to easy answers and may well dictate the use
of particular technologies (even if not otherwise cost effective). Moreover,
as Matheson notes, there are important enforcement questions that are only
beginning to be examined-such as whether a licensee could "game" the
system by using multiple transmitters and spillover limits.'47 Unfortunately,
Matheson does not analyze the nature of radio propagation and the implica-
tions of its wide variations for establishing clear and enforceable property-
like rights in the radio resource. Part II.B addresses this very challenge.
B. Radio Wave Propagation and Spectrum Rights
As we discussed earlier, radio waves weaken as they travel away from
the transmitter. In theoretical free space, radio waves steadily weaken in a
very uniform, predictable way and at a rate that depends upon the fre-
quency. '48 The higher the frequency, the faster the waves weaken.'49 In the
real world, the situation is much more complicated and radio waves are
affected by the shape of the earth, the atmosphere, the intervening topogra-
phy, and natural and manmade objects such as foliage and buildings.'50 The
magnitude of these effects depends heavily upon the relevant frequency
(again, with the higher frequencies generally affected more). 5'
At the lowest radio frequencies, below 100 kHz or so, radio signals
travel in a reliable way between the earth and a portion of the atmosphere
known as the ionosphere.'52 Thus, using very high power transmitters,
146 See infra p. 593.
147 Matheson, supra note 134, at 148-49 (concluding that because a region owner may potentially
increase his allowed spillover by arbitrarily subdividing his territory, such subdivisions should not be
allowed).
148 ASRAR U.H. SHEIKH, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS: THEORY AND TECHNIQUES 22-24 (2004).
149 Id. at 22-23.
150 See generally HENRY L. BERTONI, RADIO PROPAGATION FOR MODERN WIRELESS SYSTEMS
171-251 (2000) (describing the effects of buildings, trees, and terrain features on radio propagation).
151 Notably, at higher frequencies, the size of efficient antennas is smaller and it is correspondingly
easier to focus the radio waves in a particular direction (and thus to utilize the direction-of-arrival di-
mension discussed earlier). See KENT SMITH, RF MONOLITHICS, INC., ANTENNAS FOR LOW POWER
APPLICATIONS 1 (2000), http://www.rfm.com/support/apnotes/antenna.pdf (2000) (stating that wave-
length is "[i]mportant for determination of antenna length"); see also Radiall/Larsen Antenna Technolo-
gies, Basic Antenna Concepts, http://www.radiallIarsen.com/technicalreference-basicantennaconcepts.
htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (introducing the relationship between antenna size and wavelength).
152 See Ham-Shack.com, Radio-Wave Propagation, http://ham-shack.com/propagation.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2008). The ionosphere is "part of the earth's atmosphere extending from about 70 to 500
kilometers [above the earth], in which ions and free electrons exist in sufficient quantities to reflect
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guided signals sent at this frequency can travel over great distances and
penetrate into the ocean. ' At higher frequencies, in roughly the 300 kHz to
3 MHz range, radio technology relies on two basic modes of propagation:
ground waves and sky waves.'54 Ground waves, as the name suggests,
travel close to the earth's surface (and thus cover limited distances unless
repeated) whereas sky waves travel into the earth's atmosphere and are
reflected or bounced back (often over a very long distance) by the iono-
sphere. 1"
Transmissions using the lowest frequencies are likely to be unpredict-
able. For example, the strength of the signal from traditional AM broadcast-
ing stations (and the interference between and among them) is likely to vary
significantly from daytime to nighttime, from location to location and from
season to season. 156 In the daytime, ground waves provide coverage and the
service is comparatively reliable to that of radio transmissions using higher
bands but relatively limited in range. 57 In the nighttime, however, reflec-
tions from the ionosphere carry the radio signals in this range beyond the
horizon, permitting coverage over much greater distances but with less sta-
bility because of the ionosphere's highly variable conditions. "'
and/or refract electromagnetic waves." NAT'L COMMC'NS SYS. TECH. & STANDARD DIV., INST. FOR
TELECOMM. Scis., FEDERAL STANDARD 1037C, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: GLOSSARY OF
TELECOMMUNICATION TERMS (1996) [hereinafter FEDERAL STANDARD 1037C], available at http://
www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037 (defining "ionosphere"). The ionization is produced by radiation from the
sun and hence varies with the position of the sun and with solar activity. BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at
218-19.
153 BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 309.
154 Some radio waves travel along the earth's curve, rather than in a straight line into space.
BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 52-78. Other kinds of radio waves are more influenced by atmospheric
conditions. See generally id. at 79-143, 218-55 (discussing the influence of troposphere and ionosphere
on radio wave propagation).
155 Ham-Shack.com, supra note 152.
156 In the daytime, AM radio signals primarily use ground wave propagation. At night, however,
they also propagate through reflection off the ionosphere. Robert A. Anthony, Towards Simplicity and
Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (1971) ("The
propagation characteristics of signals in the lower AM frequency range are much more complex, and are
more generative of distant interference. The longer AM waves tend to follow the curvature of the earth;
also, at night, they bounce back from the ionosphere in "skywave" effect and return to the surface at
considerable distances."); FCC, Why AM Radio Stations Must Reduce Power, Change Operations, or
Cease Operations at Night, http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/bickel/daytime.html (last visited Jan. 11,
2008); see also BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 309 (stating that low frequency waves "suffer significant
absorption during the day"); Ham-Shaek.com, supra note 152 (stating that AM signals are ground waves
during the day, and describing the effects of solar conditions and weather on the ionosphere, and the
consequent effects on radio propagation).
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The next highest range of the spectrum, the 3 MHz to 30 MHz range,
is traditionally referred to as the shortwave region.159 In this region, the
ground wave component becomes less important and reflections from the
ionosphere or even serial reflections between the earth and the ionosphere
carry the signals over vast distances."'6 Before the advent of communica-
tions satellites and high capacity undersea fiber optic cables, this portion of
the spectrum was particularly prized for long haul, intercontinental commu-
nications in military, governmental, and commercial applications. 161 Propa-
gation conditions in this region of the spectrum vary widely with the condi-
tion of the ionosphere (including the maximum frequency that will be suc-
cessfully reflected) and those conditions depend upon location, season of
the year, time of day, and level of solar activity. 162 Because of this high
variability, the relatively limited bandwidth available, and the size of the
antennas required, this portion of the spectrum is no longer as highly desir-
able. 1
63
The region of the spectrum between 30 MHz and 300 MHz is known
as the very high frequency ("VHF") region and it is home to a number of
popular services including VHF television, FM radio broadcasting, and a
number of mobile services."'4 The lower portions of the VHF range exhibit
some of the negative characteristics of the shortwave region because very
long distance ionospheric propagation and associated interference occur in
certain seasons, efficient antennas are still somewhat unwieldy for mo-
bile/portable applications, and building penetration is often difficult.'65
159 FEDERAL STANDARD 1037C, supra note 152 (definition of "shortwave").
160 BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 309-10.
161 The shortwave bands were initially thought to be of little value, and were relegated to amateur
use. Amateurs soon, however, were using these frequencies to carry out intercontinental communica-
tions. National Radio Astronomy Observatory, Early Radio Astronomy: The Ham Radio Connection,
http://www.nrao.edu/whatisra/hist-ham.shtml (last visited Jan. 9, 2008). Commercial use of shortwave
bands for long-distance and even international broadcasting followed. See generally JEROME S. BERG,
ON THE SHORT WAVES, 1923-1945 (1999). Some military use of shortwave frequencies continues to this
day. Top 100 Military Shortwave Frequencies, http://w6yra.bol.ucla.edu/hfnil.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2008).
162 BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 310 ("[T]he use of [short waves] depends crucially on choosing...
a specific time of day .... The major difficulty is due to... fluctuations in the ionosphere .... "); see
also Ham-Shack.com, supra note 152.
163 Shortwave radio broadcasting is commonly viewed as an outdated technology. For instance,
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, then-chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, when justifying budget
cuts that would eliminate much shortwave Voice of America programming wrote that "satellite televi-
sion is to the future what shortwave radio was to the past." Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Liberty TV, WALL
ST. J., May 6, 2006, at A8; see also David Folkenflik, Budget Proposal Cuts English-Language Broad-
casts, NPR, Feb. 13, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=5204369.
164 Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., United States Frequency Allocations, http://www.ntia.doc.
gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
165 NAT'L ACADS. OF EMERGENCY DISPATCH, EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATOR 137 (2001).
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The ultra high frequency ("UHF") portion of the radio spectrum-the
portion between 300 MHz and 3,000 MHz (3 GHz)-is widely regarded as
the most desirable range for a variety of applications, especially those in-
volving communications with mobile/portable devices.166 For this reason,
some UHF bands-such as those used for television broadcasting (in the
700 MHz band)-are called "beachfront property."'67 Users of these bands
can transmit with reasonably-sized directive antennas, easily generate ade-
quate power levels, and readily transmit into and around buildings. In so
doing, they could also avoid undesirable ionospheric reflections and worry
less about natural and man-made sources of unintended interference (e.g.,
from florescent lights or digital computers).'68 Consequently, this region is
home to UHF television broadcasting, cellular telephony, and a host of
other important services. '
Despite its desirable, more stable characteristics, radio signals in this
portion of the spectrum are still subject to vagaries that cause the strength
of signals to vary widely. The signals are subject to being: (1) refracted
(bent) by the earth's atmosphere; (2) diffracted (turned) by edges of ob-
structions such as buildings; and (3) reflected (bounced) off of natural and
man-made obstacles such as mountains and buildings.'70 Unlike higher re-
gions of the radio spectrum, frequencies in this range are not affected sig-
nificantly by rain, snow, and fog, but the signals are absorbed to varying
degrees by foliage and other clutter.'7
166 Press Release, UMTS Forum, UHF Spectrum Needed to Secure Latin America's Mobile
Broadband Future, Says UMTS Forum (Jul. 2, 2007), http://www.umts-forum.org/content/view/
2138/110 ("These frequencies ... are ideally suited to providing wide-area coverage for broadband
mobile services .... ).
167 The use of the term "beachfront property" to describe UHF bands is widespread. See, e.g., On
the Same Wavelength, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 2004, at 61, 63. To appreciate the favorable characteristics
of these bands, consider that "one access point in a 700 MHz network can cover the same area as four
access points in a 2.4 GHz network or 10 access points in a 4.9 GHz network." Donny Jackson, All or
Nothing, MRT MAG., Jan. 1, 2005, available at http://mrtmag.com/mag/radio nothing.
168 BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 310-11.
169 Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., supra note 164.
170 BERTONI, supra note 150.
171 In yet another complication, frequencies in the UHF range are subject to multipath fading. As
the name implies, multipath fading is produced when multiple copies of the same signal arrive at a
receiver via different paths. This might include a direct or "line of sight path" from the transmitting
antenna to the receiving antenna and one or more indirect paths created by reflections from buildings,
nearby vehicles, water, or other terrain features such as mountains. (In over-the-air television, multipath
is what sometimes produces a "ghost" image on a television screen. The ghost is an image that arrives
later due to the presence of multipath.) Because the reflected signals travel over a longer distance than
the direct signal, they arrive at slightly later times or, to use the more technical term, with different
phases. In some cases, when the different signals are "in-phase," they will add together in the receiver
and increase the strength of the received signals. In other cases, when the signals arrive "out-of-phase,"
they will tend to cancel each other out, producing sometimes very deep fades in the signal power re-
ceived.
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The above description of radio propagation in the 300 Ifllz to 3 GHz
range implies rather static conditions but, of course, the actual situation is
typically much more dynamic. For example, the amount of atmospheric
refraction is not constant; rather, it changes with weather conditions.'72 At-
mospheric refraction of radio waves is useful because it normally extends
the transmission range somewhat beyond the physical horizon.'73 As the
refractive index changes with weather patterns, however, it changes signal
strengths at a particular location.'74 In certain summertime conditions and
over bodies of water, the radio signal may be carried over great distances
(hundreds of kilometers) due to a phenomenon known as "ducting."' 75 This
may produce much stronger signals (and, hence, greater interference) in
distant receivers than normal.'76 Longer term variations in received signal
strength can also be produced by seasonal variations in the amount of signal
absorbing foliage. "'
In addition to time variations in received signal strength at a particular
location, even slight changes in location can produce wide variations as
well. For example, where a transmission may involve multiple transmission
paths, a slight change in location (a few tens of centimeters) may mean that
signals which formerly combined to produce a stronger signal subtract from
or cancel one another to produce a much weaker signal.'78 In addition, once
a person using a cellular radio handset in the radio "shadow" of a tall build-
ing moves around the corner, the signal may increase significantly. " Simi-
larly, the strength of the received signal can vary significantly with alti-
tude.' 80 For example, a receiver located at ground level may receive a very
weak signal from a transmitter while a receiver located in the upper stories
of a nearby building and with a line of sight to the transmitter may receive a
very strong signal. In short, even the signal strength using the most valued
spectrum varies significantly with time, small location changes, and altitude
changes. '
Because UHF signals travel different paths, the strength of the desired
signal and interfering signals will often vary independently so that interfer-
172 BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 123.
173 Id. at 310-11.
174 See id.
175 STAN GIBILISCO, PHYSICS DEMYSTIFED 481 (2002).
176 PAUL BEDELL, WIRELESS CRASH COURSE 52 (2005).
177 BERTONI, supra note 150, at 201.
178 Id. at 36 (describing the phenomenon of "fast fading" which is often the result of multipath
propagation).
179 See generally id. at 141-76.
180 Some of the issues involved in considerations of antenna height are discussed in R. DEAN
STRAW & GERALD L. HALL, ANTENNA HEIGHT AND COMMUNICATIONS EFFECTIVENESS (2d ed. 1999),
http://www2.arrl.org/FandES/field/regulations/local/antplnr.pdf.
181 See Bernard H. Fleury & Peter E. Leuthold, Radiowave Propagation in Mobile Communica-
tions: An Overview of European Research, IEEE COMMNS. MAG., Feb. 1996, at 70, 71-72.
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ence may manifest itself one moment and virtually disappear the next. "'
The variability that inheres in such transmissions means that (1) the desired
and interfering signal strengths at particular locations can, as a practical
matter, only be predicted in a statistical sense and (2) field measurements
of signal strengths (e.g., to detect "trespass") must take into account these
same variations to the extent that the signal strength limit at the boundary is
defined statistically. To date, however, commentators have largely glossed
over this critical point, proceeding as if the signal strength at the boundary
is constant and thus can create an enforceable boundary." 3
C. The Case ofAMRadio
To underscore the underappreciated challenges of defining property
rights in spectrum, consider the case of AM radio. As a valued social use of
the radio spectrum as well as one of its earliest uses, AM radio provides an
instructive case study. For our purposes, the bands used for AM radio are
significant because they exhibit some of the widest variability in propaga-
tion conditions and make defining appropriate property rights in spectrum
particularly challenging.
In the AM broadcast band between 550 kHz and 1.71 MHz, the propa-
gation conditions change dramatically due to the influence of the iono-
sphere. During the daytime, the lower layers of ionosphere absorb radio
waves in this range, making it difficult (and rare) for signals to travel very
long distances. Thus, during the day, the transmission ranges are limited to
ground wave distances. During the nighttime hours, however, the lower
layers of the ionosphere disappear, and the upper layers reflect the waves
far beyond the horizon. 184 During the transition hours between daytime and
nighttime, the signal levels are particularly volatile. 185
182 See FEDERAL STANDARD 1037C, supra note 152 (defining the term "multipath" and stating that
its effects include "constructive and destructive interference").
183 The United Kingdom's spectrum regulator (Ofcom), which is further along the path of spectrum
reform than the United States, has recognized this point: "As signal levels can vary due to propagation
effects, it is appropriate to define the [relevant power levels] for an associated percentage of time. While
often this is based upon [a statistically defined] median level (to assist in measurement) this can result in
the risk of levels of interference above the threshold [in practice]." EGIS SPECTRUM ENG'G, SPECTRUM
USAGE RIGHTS: OFCOM, FINAL REPORT 37 (2006), available at http://www.aegis-systems.co.uk/down
load/172 1/casestudies.pdf.
184 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
185 See FCC, Local Sunrise / Sunset Calculations, http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/bickel/srsstime
.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2008). Of course, sunrise and sunset times vary daily, and by latitude and
longitude. See id. Furthermore, changes in the ionosphere do not occur instantly. Id. Indeed, the FCC's
regulatory practice takes note of this. Because the propagation characteristics of AM radio are so differ-
ent at night, many AM radio stations are required to broadcast at a lower power during nighttime hours.
Id. However, "in recognition that changes in the ionosphere.., do not occur instantly at nightfall or at
sunrise," the FCC grants special pre-sunrise and post-sunrise authority to certain stations. Id.
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The conditions of the upper layers of the ionosphere not only vary
widely at night and during transition hours, they vary from hour to hour,
with the season of the year, the level of solar activity, and the location (e.g.,
latitude) of the transmission path.'86 Moreover, this portion of the spectrum
is particularly susceptible to natural interference (i.e., static) produced by
lightning strikes from both local and distant thunderstorms.'87 During the
summer months this static may effectively mask interference from distant
stations while, during the quiet winter months, signals from thousands of
kilometers away produce noticeable interference to local stations.'88 Finally,
the interference between the ground wave and sky wave signals can, at cer-
tain distances, cause severe multipath fading effects, making the desired
signal more or less susceptible to interference from one moment to the next.
For bands like the one traditionally used for AM broadcasting, provid-
ing licensees with clearly defined interference protection-at least using the
classic property law trespass concept-seems impractical, if not impossible.
If, for example, a station in another geographic area could prosecute a tres-
pass claim against a transmitter that created interference, it could seek relief
based upon a series of natural conditions that happen only infrequently.
Stated in terms used by the De Vany study, the question is: under what
conditions do you measure signal strength at the boundary? Unfortunately,
no easy answers to this question exist because the realities of radio wave
propagation in this spectrum region simply do not lend themselves to clear
and enforceable boundaries for the geographic area dimension of the spec-
trum resource.
Charles Jackson recognized the long-range interference issues associ-
ated with the AM broadcasting band and argued that the pervasive interfer-
ence in the band "creates multiple interlocking externalities that cannot be
properly taken into account in simple market transactions."' 89 He con-
cluded, as we do, that "a spectrum management system for the AM band
using property rights based on station licenses would face enormous diffi-
culties."' 9 ° Moreover, Jackson concluded, as we noted above and discuss
below, that the cellular bands are more amenable to a property right regime
because of "limited signal range, systems operating over large blocks of
186 BOITHIAS, supra note 42, at 244-45.
187 Charles Jackson, Raymond Pickholtz & Dale Hatfield, Spread Spectrum Is Good-But It Does
Not Obsolete NBC v. U.S.!, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 245, 260 (2006) ("In the AM band, the primary source
of radio noise is either distant lightning... or nearby electrical equipment .... ).
188 In engineering circles, the effect of lightning on radio signals is known as "atmospherics." For
an introduction to atmospherics, as well as a chart illustrating the varying levels of atmospherics by
season, time of day, and latitude/longitude, see BOITHIAS, supra note 172, at 290-91.
189 Charles Jackson, Limits to Decentralization: The Example ofAM Radio Broadcasting or Was a
Common Law Solution to Chaos in the Radio Waves Reasonable in 1927? 1 (Aug. 29, 2005), http://web.
si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/454/Limits%2to%20Distributed%2Decisionmaking%2OTPRC%20200
5.pdf.
190 Id. at 1.
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bandwidth and over large geographic regions, and control of both transmit-
ters and receivers by the system operator.-
19'
Were licensees conferred property rights in spectrum along the lines
available for landowners, they might bring trespass claims as a means of
extracting payments from unlucky transmitters. In particular, Firm A could
acquire a license for an area reached, even very intermittently, from Firm B,
which is already in operation and does not possess the right to transmit to
that location at that signal strength. Firm A could bring a trespass action
against Firm B and gain enormous leverage over Firm B, which would fear
an injunction stopping its service or forcing it to pay to avoid causing the
trespass.'92 To prevent this outcome, Firm B might agree to a costly and
oppressive "licensing" or "easement" arrangement that provides great re-
wards to Firm A regardless of whether Firm A is using or intends to use its
spectrum at all. In our view, this scenario might well be worse than the cur-
rent system's reliance on "muddy entitlements" (i.e., ill-defined rules that
are enforced only to a limited degree,'93 as in the case of AM radio).
The above discussion of an entity acquiring a property right and op-
portunistically enforcing it is hardly speculative. Rather, it parallels the
intellectual property rights phenomenon of the "patent troll."' 94 In the case
of patent trolls, firms buy up patent rights-which provide a complete right
to exclude others from using an invention without permission 95-knowing
that other firms are using an infringing invention unaware of the patent.
Then, without providing a product itself, the patent troll threatens to enforce
its patent rights (and obtain an injunction) against the allegedly infringing
party.'96 Because the invention user has made irreversible investments, the
191 Id. at 32.
192 In theory, this situation could occur in land where a firm purchased a property right next to a
would-be nuisance. The rules of nuisance law, however, require an actual harm to the property owner,
whereas "trespass" law requires merely a violation of the relevant boundary. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821D cmt. D (1979).
193 The concept of "muddy entitlements" is often identified with Carol Rose. See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590, 592 (1988).
194 For illustrative uses of the term "patent troll," including several early uses, see Word Spy,
Patent Troll (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www.wordspy.com/words/patenttroll.asp. For a balanced look at
someone accused of being a patent troll, see Nicholas Varchaver, Who 's Afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?,
FORTUNE, Jul. 10, 2006, at 110.
195 U.S. PATENT & TRADMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS, http://
www.uspto.gov/go/pac/doc/general/ (2005) ("The right conferred by the patent grant is, in the language
of the statute and of the grant itself, 'the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling' the invention in the United States or 'importing' the invention into the United States. What is
granted is not the right to make, use, offer for sale, sell or import, but the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the invention.").
196 In its report evaluating the competition policy case for patent law reform, the Federal Trade
Commission explained that "non-practicing entities" can "obtain and enforce patents against other firms,
but either have no product or do not create or sell a product that is vulnerable to infringement counter-
suit by the company against which the patent is being enforced." Consequently, such firms can threaten
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patent troll can use its leverage to extract a significant licensing fee. 1' In
the famous case brought by NTP, Inc. against Research In Motion Ltd.
("RIM"), NTP threatened to enjoin the use of technology underlying the
popular BlackBerry product to secure an over $600 million settlement, even
though the Patent and Trademark Office was reexamining these patents.198
To be sure, the facts of that case as well as the actual extent of the patent
troll problem are debatable (as is the proper definition of what is a patent
troll),' 99 but our point is that the development of rights in spectrum should
be devised to avoid a similar problem.
D. Establishing Rights by Using Predictive Models
To design radio systems that utilize the 300 MHz to 3 GHz range of
the spectrum, engineers make extensive use of predictive models to esti-
mate the performance of radio transmissions. In basic terms, these models
are used to compute what is known as "transmission loss" (i.e., the change
in signal power from the output of the transmitter to the input of the re-
ceiver).2" By knowing the transmitter output power and the predicted
transmission loss for a particular path, an engineer can estimate the strength
of the signal received by the receiver.2"' Moreover, the same models can
also predict the level of interference caused by other, distant transmitters
that operate on the same or adjacent channels.2 2 Calculating the desired
signal level and the undesired signal(s) level while considering the assumed
or measured characteristics of the receiver, the engineer can estimate the
"patent infringement [suits] and an injunction, which, if granted, could inflict substantial losses." FTC,
To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38
(2003).
197 See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVE., PATENT REFORM:
INNOVATION ISSUES 33 (2005) ("In the view of some observers, [the threat of an injunction] has encour-
aged strategic behavior by [patent] speculators."); Alex V. Chachkes, EBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC:
A New Landscape for Patent Litigation, 72 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 130, 130 (2006)
("Wielding the threat of the almost-mandatory permanent injunction, patent owners have been filing
more suits, law firms have been more willing to take the risk of a patent contingent-fee case, and the
industry of the patent troll has flourished.").
198 Mark Heinzl & Amol Shama, Getting the Message: RIM to Pay NTP $612.5 Million to Settle
BlackBerry Patent Suit-With Pact, Tech Firm Avoids Court-Ordered Shutdown of Popular Wireless
Device, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at Al.
199 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 980776, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=980776.
200 See, e.g., Joram Walfisch & Henry L. Bertoni, A Theoretical Model of UHF Propagation in
Urban Environments, 36 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ANTENNAS & PROPAGATION 1788 (1988).
201 Id. at 1793-94.
202 See, e.g., Theodore S. Rappaport & Sandip Sandhu, Radio-Wave Propagation for Emerging
Wireless Personal-Communications Systems, IEEE ANTENNAS AND PROPAGATION MAG., Oct. 1994, at
14-15.
2008]
GEO. MASON L. REv.
end-to-end performance of the radio transmission in terms of, say, availabil-
ity and audio quality (e.g., bit error rate).2"3 Consequently, the engineer can
conduct cost and performance tradeoffs (e.g., among an increase in signal
power at the transmitter, a more focused, directive antenna, or improved
sensitivity of the receiver).
As the existing regulatory regime recognizes, any effective regulation
of spectrum must rely, at least to some degree, on predictions of signal
strength (and likely interference). Predictive models range from relatively
simple ones ("back of the envelope calculations") to very complex software
programs.2" Complex models are typically based upon electromagnetic
wave theory, empirical results from extensive field measurements in differ-
ent environments, or, quite often, a combination of the two.
In addition to their complexity, models also differ in how they deal
with site specific factors. In some cases, the relevant information (e.g., the
locations of both end user devices and the intervening terrain) will not be
known in any detail, leading engineers to rely on "site general" models.2"5
A site general model is likely to yield predictions of signal strength along a
line from the transmitter site that decreases at a consistent rate with in-
creased distance from the site.20 6 By adopting the simplifying assumption
that signal strength drops off consistently with increased distance from the
transmitter, site general models produce smooth coverage contours around
the transmitter and produce neat maps of where a signal can supposedly be
detected. 207
To some property rights commentators, a site general model (as illus-
trated below in Figure 2 with respect to a TV station in Denver, Colorado)
provides a picture of spectrum rights that is deceptively similar to real
property. In reality, the actual terrain and the presence of buildings and
other urban clutter can strengthen or weaken the actual signal strength.
Buildings, for example, can cause a signal to drop significantly in an area
that they "shadow" from the transmitter and then the signal can recover
beyond that area. 2 ' For users of cellular telephones, this phenomenon is the
explanation for some of the frustrating "holes" or gaps in coverage within a
service area. Similarly, a hilltop or other favorable location that permits a
203 See, e.g., id. at 15, 18.
204 Simple models may be useful to roughly determine broadcast coverage, for example, or for
predicting communications abilities between, say, two earth orbiting satellites with only open space
between them. Complex models are more appropriate where the intervening terrain is hilly or mountain-
ous, substantial urban clutter exists, or heavy foliage or in-building coverage is involved.
205 HARRY R. ANDERSON, FIXED BROADBAND WIRELESS SYSTEM DESIGN 78 (2003).
206 Jan Doeven, Terrestrial Service Area Planning, in BROADCAST ENGINEER'S REFERENCE BOOK
767, 773-75 (E.P.J. Tozer ed., 2004).
207 Id. at 775.
208 Neal H. Shepherd, Radio Wave Loss Deviation and Shadow Loss at 900 MHz, 26 IEEE TRANS.
ON VEHICULAR TECH. 309 (1977).
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greater line of sight path to the transmitter site may actually increase a sig-
nal significantly more than a simple, general model might predict.
209
Figure 2: Predicted Coverage for Denver TV Station
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In some cases, a predicted model of signal coverage and its real-world
counterpart will look nothing alike. In reality, islands of coverage may exist
well beyond the predicted contour (as indicated in Figure 3 below). More-
over, gaps and islands of coverage so numerous and complex in shape (on
account of hilly or mountainous terrain or areas with tall buildings or other
obstructions) may render meaningless a predicted boundary. Television
broadcasters, for example, often have predicated signal strength curves (the
so called "Grade B contour") that bear little resemblance to the actual pres-
ence of the signal."' t To appreciate this point, compare Figure 3's actual
209 BERTONI, supra note 150, at 187-201 (modeling terrain effects).
210 Notably, the scope of the theoretical range of a Grade B coverage contour versus its reality
became controversial because the theoretical availability of local television signals-and not the practi-
cal reality-determined whether satellite providers could deliver distant network programming to "un-
served" households (i.e., those unable to receive local television broadcasts). See CBS Inc. v. Prime-
Time 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2001). Ultimately, Congress settled this
controversy-and prevented an injunction from taking effect that would have deprived a large number
of satellite subscribers of their access to network television-by enacting the Satellite Home Viewers
Improvement Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 122(a), (f), 0)(2) (2006); see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra
note 10, at 367-69.
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signal strength to the site general model of the same area as depicted in
Figure 2.
Figure 3: Actual Coverage for Denver TV Station
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given vicinity exceeds some value x percentage of the time and at y percent
of the locations within that vicinity. Consequently, the Grade B coverage
contour for a television broadcast station means that a signal above a speci-
fied strength can be detected 50% of the time and at 50% of the locations
along the contour .2 " The predicted strength of interfering signals at a par-
211 See BERTONI, supra note 150, at 248 (describing the difference between predictions and meas-
urements in a site specific model); Leonard Piazzi & Henry L. Bertoni, Achievable Accuracy of Site-
Specific Path-Loss Predictions in Residential Environments, 48 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR
TECH. 922 (1999).
212 For a treatment of site-specific prediction of signal propagation, see BERTONI, supra note 150,
at 217-48.
213 Notice of Inquiry, Technical Standards for Determining Eligibility For Satellite-Delivered
Network Signals Pursuant to the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act, 20
F.C.C.R. 9349, para. 4 (May 3, 2005).
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ticular point will thus have similar statistical characteristics.2 4 In short, the
contours of a coverage area are not sharply defined boundaries like the
metes and bounds of real property."1 5
A number of reasons account for the deviation between predicted
models and reality, including the use of certain assumptions and planning
factors. For example, when establishing allotments and assignments in tele-
vision broadcasting, regulators make assumptions about the receiving an-
tenna's height and directivity, the reduction in signal strength in the cable
going from the receiving antenna to the receiver, and the required desired-
to-undesired signal ratio for acceptable receiver performance." 6 If the sys-
tems do not actually conform to these assumptions, the possibility of inter-
ference becomes much more (or less) likely than the prediction.
The ability to generate different outcomes based on planning factors is
a considerable wild card in any predictive model. As noted above, a trans-
mitting antenna located at ground level (or, even worse, inside a building)
will produce a much weaker signal than one mounted on a rooftop above
the surrounding obstructions. Moreover, the receiver might also vary from
model to model or manufacturer to manufacturer.
The final challenge, which presents complications in cases like TV
broadcasting, is that the licensee may only control the transmission equip-
ment and not the receivers. The consumer may buy equipment with capa-
bilities different from those assumed in the model, making the predictions
of any model less likely to be accurate. The unpredictability as to such ser-
vices would grow considerably under a true property rights system where
particular bands could be used for any type of service or technology,
thereby making the relevant measurements and assessments of receiver
performance much more complex and uncertain insofar as it would be more
challenging to develop a benchmark case where a variety of different de-
vices were being used. We shall return to such complications in Part IV, but
first, Part III explains the reasons for the often touted successful property
rights approach used in the cellular bands as well as what lessons policy-
makers should draw from this history.
214 Wayne Bretl et al., ATSC RF, Modulation, and Transmission, 94 PROC. IEEE 44, 45-46 (de-
scribing statistical interference models).
215 FCC, FM AND TV CONTOUR DATA POINTS, http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/bickel/contour-
data.htmI (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) ("FM and TV service contours usually do not define the outer limit
of service. In most cases, a radio or television station may be received at locations outside ... the ser-
vice contours .... Within the service contour, reception is generally protected from interference caused
by other stations on the same channel or adjacent channels or frequencies. Outside of that contour,
interference may occur from other stations. It simply is not possible ... to protect each station [from
interference from other stations outside of their contours.]").
216 See O'Connor, supra note 54.
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III. GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPECTRUM
In Part II, we explained why radio propagation makes the establish-
ment of property rights in spectrum a complicated endeavor. This argument
challenges the conventional wisdom that establishing spectrum property
rights is a fairly straightforward issue and can be managed along the lines
outlined in the De Vany study. In championing the De Vany view, modem
adherents such as Kwerel and Williams routinely point to the vibrant trad-
ing and management of property-like rights in the cellular bands to bolster
their claim that spectrum property rights are easily manageable. As we dis-
cuss in Part III.A, however, this claim overlooks some particular conditions
that make the cellular bands an exceptional case. Rather, as Part III.B ex-
plains, more elaborate before-the-fact and after-the-fact procedures are nec-
essary to ensure that property rights in spectrum work effectively.
A. The Cellular Bands: Precursor or Anomaly?
Despite the difficulties associated with establishing property rights in
the space and frequency dimensions, the cases of television broadcasting
and cellular telephone service provide powerful precedents that when the
FCC has established property rights in certain services, interference issues
at the associated boundaries can be successfully resolved." 7 Notably, valu-
able transactions involving the transfer of those rights take place on a rou-
tine basis, and affected parties work together to minimize interference. In
cellular services, for example, the geographic spillover limit is the maxi-
mum signal strength permitted at the boundary and disputes over interfer-
ence there are routinely resolved without the involvement of the FCC.2"8
To understand the successful management of property rights in the cel-
lular context, policy observers must appreciate two distinct aspects of these
services. First, the technical characteristics of cellular services make them
less prone to interference. In particular, not only do the large geographic
areas associated with cellular bands219 make geographic spillover problem-
atic only in a relatively small percentage of the total area, but the fact that
217 Kwerel & Williams, supra note 121, at 6.
218 E-Mail from James D. Young, President, U.S. Tower Operations, Crown Castle Int'l Corp., to
Dale Hatfield (Feb. 20, 2008) (on file with author) ("RF interference issues between wireless carriers are
always resolved in the field without FCC intervention.").
219 Our reference to the "cellular bands" here does not mean to discuss only those bands originally
used for cellular, but to include all subsequent bands that were authorized for flexible uses, including,
but not limited to, the PCS, SMR, and AWS bands. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at
267 (discussing technical definition of"commercial mobile radio service").
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such systems are "cellularized 2  (i.e., the transmission systems operate in
distinct areas) creates a greater opportunity to carefully tailor coverage to
limit interference among a limited number of firms. Second, providers of
cellular services are stable and "repeat players" 2 1 creating considerable
incentives for cooperative behavior and against engaging in strategic behav-
ior along the lines of patent trolls.
Like other environments where industry norms are effective regula-
tors, cellular providers appreciate that each party possesses a mutual threat
of interference and that all providers are better off as a result of cooperating
with one another.222 Moreover, such negotiations continue over time and
often involve engineers who may adhere to a professional ethic to act in
good faith (i.e., honestly report technical capabilities and limits).223 Signifi-
cantly, because of repeated transactions among a relatively small group of
firms, this environment is uniquely suited to cooperative behavior-even if
the entitlements themselves are not clearly defined or enforced by the FCC.
Along the lines of Stewart Macaulay's landmark study of how businesses
that dealt with one another regularly behave, cellular providers realize that
"'[y]ou don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want
to do business again.' ' 224 Consequently, even though the reality of the spec-
trum property right is "muddy," the affected parties can still agree on mutu-
ally beneficial accommodations, thereby providing a potentially misleading
case upon which to build an entire regulatory regime.
Given the unique technology, professional ethos, and market condi-
tions prevailing in the cellular bands, the optimism that Kwerel and Wil-
liams take from the cellular context is potentially misplaced. As a theoreti-
cal matter, transaction costs between identifiable neighboring users of spec-
trum will be low and mutually beneficial arrangements will be the rule. As
a practical matter, however, we are skeptical that this confidence will be
borne out in numerous other contexts and think the uncertainty (or "muddi-
ness") of geographic boundary rights caused by signal strength variations
will make agreeing on reasonable arrangements to avoid interference diffi-
220 By cellularized, we refer to the use of the technology of transmitting radio signals within rela-
tively small "cells." See id. at 263.
221 "Repeat playing" refers to the game theory concept of when firms are involved in the same
"game" over and over. This type of game, in contrast to a "single shot game," is far more likely to elicit
a cooperative outcome. For the classic discussion of this game theory concept, see ROBERT M.
AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
222 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
223 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is the professional organization for
radio engineers. It requires its members "to be honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates based
on available data." IEEE Code of Ethics (2006), http://www.ieee.org/portal/pages/iportals/aboutus/
ethics/code.html.
224 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55, 61 (1963).
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cult. Instead, we believe that regular or occasional islands of interference
across geographic boundaries that are tolerated today will become the sub-
ject of litigation seeking to define more clearly spectrum rights (and obtain
injunctive relief to enforce those rights). In the worst possible case, such
litigation will be strategic and brought by the spectrum equivalents of pat-
ent trolls.
The economics literature explaining the success of cooperative ar-
rangements like those developed to minimize interference in the cellular
bands underscores that close-knit business environments can reinforce co-
operation. In other environments, by contrast, the social norms that under-
pin such commitments may break down. As Jason Johnson has explained,
"[w]ithin suitably dense and homogenous communities, the harm to the
breacher's reputation and lost future dealings with third parties that she will
suffer when the aggrieved party tells others in the community about her
breach may supplant the 'second party' sanction of relationship termina-
tion." '225 If, however, the firms are not engaged in repeat-playing games-as
would be the case for spectrum trolls or even some firms which were not
established incumbents-they would need to resort to a third party for en-
forcement of their property rights.226 In today's environment, the FCC can
simply withhold or delay such enforcement--deliberately or not-as a
means of encouraging cellular providers to agree on cooperative arrange-
ments designed to minimize interference.227 But in a more diverse environ-
225 Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic
Model, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1859, 1874-75 (1996); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation,
and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & EcON. 691, 699 (1983) ("[I]n simple worlds with reputations, the rule
of law does not matter."). Indeed, even the claim that extra-legal enforcement (i.e., reputation sanctions)
can operate effectively in close-knit communities is open to question, as an increase in the number of
relevant parties creates challenging enforcement issues. See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William San-
chirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1281, 1294-95 (2003) (discuss-
ing enforcement problems that occur when more than two actors are involved).
226 Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
1644, 1647 (2003) (noting that conditions of repeat-playing games and significant reputation effects are
"stringent," and that when those conditions are not met, "legal enforcement is necessary"). One example
of this problem emerges from the context of standard-setting organizations, where commitments to fair
dealing and reasonable patent policies must be enforced by external legal mechanisms insofar as firms
exit from the collective enterprise of dealing and participating in the standard-setting body's mission.
See Rambus, Inc., No. 9203, 2006 FTC LEXIS 60 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006); see also Rambus
Inc. v. Infmeon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
227 In terms of the FCC's enforcement apparatus, its regular practice is to delay any dispute resolu-
tion to facilitate a mediated settlement. For instance, when the FCC created the Accelerated Docket for
complaint resolution, it required that "parties seeking to place their disputes on the Accelerated Docket
first meet for pre-filing settlement discussions supervised by Commission staff .... [The complaint]
will not be accepted onto the Accelerated Docket if the complainant has not made an adequate effort to
settle the matter through staff-supervised discussions." Report and Order, Implementation of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 17,018, para. 4 (July 14, 1998); see also Josh Long, Heavy-
Handed or Hollow?, PHONE+, Mar. 1, 2003, available at http://www.phoneplusmag.com/arti-
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ment (both in a technological and a business sense), the FCC's inability to
enforce property rights could (1) effectively undermine investment incen-
tives and the development of new services, and (2) encourage self-help be-
havior whereby parties seek to make life difficult for one another to achieve
a business advantage.228
B. Toward a New Regime for Spectrum Rights
The success of property rights in the cellular bands is a notable ac-
complishment. As explained above, this success rests on a particular set of
circumstances that is unlikely to exist across the board. After all, many
firms acquire licenses in other bands without an ongoing connection to ex-
isting incumbents and would be, under a liberalized regime, in a position to
use technology that might cause interference to neighboring licensees.
Moreover, as noted above, some firms might take advantage of a property
rights regime by acquiring licenses for the strategic purpose of claiming
interference and extracting fees from existing licensees to avoid suit. Thus,
policymakers should devise a system for managing property rights that pro-
vides a basis for making investments, ensures against harmful interference,
and avoids strategic abuses of the legal system. To do so, policymakers
must develop the right combination of front-end assurances (in the form of
a safe harbor based on a predictive model) and back-end oversight.
The overall goal of our proposed reforms is to replace the existing
command-and-control regulatory system with a more flexible system that
will facilitate marketplace arrangements and ensure that spectrum licenses
are used in an optimal fashion. As an initial matter, however, it is critical
that our proposed system reassures spectrum licensees that the new frame-
work will competently define and enforce their rights against interference.
At the same time, this new system should enable firms to effectively use
and trade the rights to use spectrum, ensuring that remedies are calibrated to
address only actual harms and not to deter more efficient uses of spectrum.
1. The Use of Predictive Models in Spectrum Property Rights
By building upon current practice in many services (e.g., television
broadcasting), we believe that spectrum-use rights can be developed upon
cles/351FEAT3.html ("[In fiscal year 2002 the] bureau also settled through mediation about 40 of 60
cases over wholesale provisioning and other competitive issues such as special access and OSS .... ").
228 One context where this issue becomes particularly problematic is where users of spectrum are
actually governmental agencies and not commercial providers. For such cases, as in the interference
disputes that arose between Nextel and public safety agencies, the role of the FCC in overseeing the
relevant interference rights is likely to be particularly important in resolving disputes. See Report and
Order, Improving Public Safety in the 800 MHz Band, 19 F.C.C.R. 14,969 (Aug. 6,2004).
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predicted signal strengths that are also subject to some after-the-fact over-
sight. As an initial matter, we believe geographical boundaries could be
established and the owner of a block of spectrum in the frequency dimen-
sion should have the right to spill energy over into the adjacent geographic
areas up to some maximum amount. Conversely, the same owner would
have the obligation to accept spillover at the boundary up to the same
maximum amount. Rather than measured at the boundary, however, the
spillover amount or level would be computed using an accepted model for
how radio signals propagate.
The premise of a strategy that relies on a predicted rather than meas-
ured level at the geographic boundary has two major advantages. First, this
approach is relatively simple, although regulators may well opt for some
degree of complexity to provide adjacent licensees with a greater level of
assurance against actual interference. Second, this approach can potentially
lower enforcement costs because regulators would use computer modeling
rather than expensive field measurements. In the case of television broad-
casting and to a certain extent cellular services, such models are already
used and, at least in a "muddy entitlements" sense, work reasonably well;
that is, firms are willing to buy TV stations and cellular systems based on
the existing legal protections against interference. Thus, as an initial ap-
proximation, even an imperfect, but reasonably well defined, property
rights regime can offer an initial basis for firms to make investment deci-
sions and deploy new services.
When arguing for spectrum regulation that provides a safe harbor de-
fined by a predictive model for each relevant band (at least for some transi-
tion period), we recognize that such a system would raise a number of chal-
lenges, including difficulties in establishing the initial maximum signal
power levels and the receiver antenna height as well as predicting the actual
level that would be transmitted. Nonetheless, to devise an effective legal
regime for spectrum rights, we believe that a predictive model must be de-
veloped to define the relevant right-a challenge not confronted by real
property rights. This model need not (and will not) be perfect; rather, it
merely needs to be good enough to allow subsequent refinements by bar-
gaining and adjudication. In any event, regulators must use the selected
model to limit expected interference to a reasonable amount (say, less than
10% of the locations 10% of the time at the boundary) and not to avoid
interference entirely. By so doing, the FCC can, as Paul Margie put it, seek
to "maximize total utility in each band rather than to minimize interference
to any individual spectrum user." '229
229 Margie, supra note 87, 67. The FCC recognized this point in its order addressing interference
issues related to broadband over powerline systems. See Report and Order, Amendment of Part 15
Regarding New Requirements and Measurement Guidelines for Access, Broadband over Power Line
Systems, ET Docket No. 03-104, 2004 WL 2411391, paras. 22-24 (Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter BPL
Order] (noting that ham radio operators have worked in tandem with other users, no interference would
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We also recognize that the government agency that selects the model
and defines the safe-harbor level of allowable expected interference will
play a critical coordination function along the lines of the role played by
zoning authorities. Just like zoning codes specify a vision for an aesthetic
expected of buildings (say, their height or even exterior configuration), safe
harbor decisions would greatly influence technology decisions. If, for ex-
ample, regulators authorized very little interference close to a designated
boundary, that would encourage low power uses as well as a cellularized
architecture. Similarly, the amount of authorized interference will greatly
influence the design of receivers and their susceptibility to interference.
Thus, we recommend that regulators adopt a set of different models for
different frequency bands, approximating to some degree the current uses
of wireless spectrum.
Unless the relevant parties can bargain to reach alternative arrange-
ments, the safe harbor's default rules could drive technology decisions re-
lated to the geographic spillover between neighbors using the same fre-
quencies (co-channel interference) and spillover in the frequency dimension
in the same geographic area (adjacent channel interference).23 ° On one
hand, setting a limit that is too stringent could force the rights-holder to
reduce power to the point of creating coverage holes near the boundary,
adopt a cellular architecture that may not be optimal for a particular service,
or deploy additional cell sites to provide adequate coverage while meeting
the spillover limit. On the other hand, setting limits that are too lenient may
impose excessive costs on the rights-holder across the geographic or fre-
quency boundary, including costs associated with increasing transmitter
power to overcome the interference or abandoning service in areas where
the interference is excessive.
Like zoning regulators' recognition that different neighborhoods serve
different needs, we believe that the best strategy for "zoning the spectrum"
is to recognize that certain bands are more conducive to some services (e.g.,
low powered, cellularized ones) and other bands are more conducive to
other ones.23' In this sense, zoning the spectrum performs a similar role to
result unless an amateur user was on top of a BPL extractor, the benefits of BPL warrant a small degree
of interference risk, and these risks can be managed through protective measures).
230 Notably, other interference mechanisms are not addressed in this paper, including: spurious
emissions from transmitters (as opposed to adjacent channel spillover in the frequency dimension),
transmitter and receiver intermodulation, and receiver desensitization due to strong out-of-band signals.
Although we do not suggest that these factors are unimportant or that a property-rights regime will not
need to account for and address them, we believe that these are secondary considerations and that the
principal challenge is developing an effective framework to govern geographic spillovers and adjacent
channel interference.
231 In principle, courts could adjust these rules by declaring such uses, at least in certain contexts,
to be a public nuisance. But like the move from courts to zoning bodies to make such decisions, we
believe that zoning the spectrum is sufficiently complex as to warrant agency-and not judicial-
oversight. Cf. Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 590 (Colo. 1973) (noting that zoning deci-
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nuisance law, which recognizes that a "nuisance may be merely a right
thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.
2 32
As in nuisance law (and zoning), the relevant classifications may need to
change over time, but the FCC must establish the relevant safe harbor based
on the particular propagation characteristics of the band, realizing that such
classifications can restrict the likely uses of the spectrum and may well cre-
ate certain economic inefficiencies. In the case of the AM band, for exam-
ple, parties should be given wide latitude whereas the cellular bands should
be zoned to demand and expect (as is currently the case) that parties can
control their interference levels carefully.
In developing a zoning code for the radio spectrum, the FCC should
avoid specifying technology or service decisions. To be sure, specific rules
will necessarily privilege certain uses, but regulators should not specify any
particular services as technologies will change over time and services
should succeed or fail in the marketplace. In short, such a code should
merely regulate the total output (i.e., actual interference) or, where neces-
sary, institute the least restrictive means of regulating inputs to guard
against the possibility of interference. In particular, by moving away from
regulating the inputs to a licensed service, the FCC would move towards
the Spectrum Policy Task Force's Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities
Working Group's recommendation to adopt "[i]nterference standards based
on outputs" because they "provide desired flexibility while protecting the
reasonable expectations of licensed and authorized service providers and
the public." '233 By staying away from regulating inputs wherever possible,
the FCC can leave it to the market to make such decisions.
sions determine what, in effect, constitutes a "public nuisance" and that courts cannot enjoin a legisla-
tively permitted public nuisance); id. at 591 ("Solutions for problems of the magnitude anticipated here
may suggest legislative and not judicial action.").
232 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
233 FCC SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE SPECTRUM RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 29 (2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/SRRWGFinal
Report.pdf; see also id. at 27 ("Parameters based on [outputs] provide licensees with greater flexibility
in determining their system architecture to meet customer density, geographic location and scope, and
cost considerations, while maintaining what should be the Commission's most basic regulatory concern:
the extent to which they impact the service of other licensees and operations.") Similarly, as one of us
has explained on the issue of why regulators should focus, wherever possible, on regulating outputs and
not inputs:
Moreover, it is better (in terms of achieving more efficient outcomes) for regulators to focus
on regulating the outputs or results they want to achieve rather than on the inputs that are
utilized to achieve those outcomes. If network reliability is a concern, then the regulator can
establish and enforce network reliability standards, leaving it to the operators to figure out
how to meet them. For their part, operators must figure out the optimal network design that
will maximize the productivity of their networks while minimizing costs. The operators, after
all, have strong economic and competitive incentives to meet the regulators' standards using
the most economical and efficient architecture and equipment.
Dale N. Hatfield & Eric Lie, Why License?, in TRENDS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 2004/2005,
at 25, 30 (2004).
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In calling for a zoning-like system, we are aware of criticisms leveled
against zoning systems in the land use context-namely, that such a role
invites rent-seeking behavior.234 As one commentator put it, "[z]oning has
particularly been criticized for procedural inadequacies: lax enforcement,
favoritism, lack of consistency with planning, and excessive rigidity in
some cases and undue flexibility in others. ' 235 Such problems might emerge
in the spectrum context, but we nonetheless prefer this model to either the
existing system or a unitary property rights model. In short, the problem
with the existing system is that it restricts possible uses of spectrum by pro-
viding limited guidance; by contrast, if the FCC adopted a unitary property
rights model, it would place a thumb on the scale that would bar certain
types of services (like AM radio) from succeeding and would not allow for
experimentation across bands (in the form of differently defined use rights).
The selection of a single form of property rights across the spectrum
would undermine differentiated uses of spectrum and push toward particu-
lar technological architectures (i.e., low-powered and cellularized). Rather
than embrace a single technology, the FCC can better serve society by
defining different types of spectrum usage rights to enable different
technologies. To be successful, such a framework must break away from
the highly restrictive existing rules and must take account of technological
realities through some form of ongoing, after-the-fact oversight that calls
for regular reassessment.
2. The Role of After-The-Fact Oversight
Developing a zoned spectrum with safe harbor rights (at least for some
period of time) and some predictability for spectrum licensees would be a
salutary development. If, however, policymakers choose to rely solely on
ex ante predictions-without any ex post evaluation of actual interference,
they would make several notable sacrifices. First, any system that provides
unconstrained discretion for the FCC to determine the specifics of a predic-
tive model risks inviting rent-seeking behavior by incumbents.236 Second,
licensees would possess limited certainty of their rights under a predictive
model, requiring them to adopt additional measures such as cooperative
arrangements or technical contingency plans. Finally, a system based on
predictions leaves open the question of how to enforce property rights when
there is a significant discrepancy between predicted and measured levels at
234 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1, 39 n.192
(2004) (collecting sources).
235 RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY 296 (1996).
236 See supra notes 30-31, 64-66, 96-99 and accompanying text.
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the boundary.17 In short, we believe that allowing some measure of a safe
harbor is critical (at least for the near term), but we are also confident that
unless the predicted contours are reasonably close to reality and checked
against it, spectrum will be underutilized and licensees may resist making
costly investments necessary to deliver a promised service.
The role of a reality check on spectrum property rights is a double-
edged sword. On one hand, the use of predictive models that do not
sufficiently match reality may allow more interference than intended and
may thus need to be altered to protect a licensee's interest. On the other
hand, as was the FCC's historic practice, the relevant models may be overly
cautious to prevent any possible interference and thus leave significant
amounts of spectrum underused. To address both issues, policymakers
should allow licensees to request greater flexibility to create interference
(i.e., the restrictions placed upon them are too great) and policymakers
should be able to restrict the amount of tolerated interference because
reality allows for more interference than anticipated in theory (i.e., the
restrictions on neighboring users are too lenient).
The nature of the reality check that we propose is a dispute resolution
forum whereby parties could bring either of the two types of challenges
noted above. In one case, in essence, they would ask for a zoning variance
based on a demonstration of the relevant technological realities-as
opposed to the predictions of the model that gave rise to the governing
restrictions. 31 In the other case, they would challenge a neighbor's (either a
user of a co-channel or adjacent channel) spectrum use. In both cases,
bargaining between the relevant neighbors should be expected and
encouraged. 39
237 It is worth noting that there are two types of discrepancies--(1) enduring levels of nontrivial
interference that, taken together, create material difficulties; or (2) transient interference levels that are
significant even if intermittent. See Jackson, Pickholtz & Hatfield, supra note 187, at 255.
238 Of late, the FCC has begun to grant such requests with increasing regularity, implicitly
recognizing the limitations of statistical models that predict interference, taking important strides to
ground its spectrum policy in reality and moving towards a more consistent focus on "harmful
interference." Consider, for example, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau's waiver of some
technical requirements to permit land mobile base stations to operate within a television broadcast
radius. In that case, the Bureau recognized the hypothetical nature of the "Grade B contour" radius and
explained that this hypothetical form of protection did not prevent the authorization of another use. In
particular, the Bureau made clear that because: (1) any possible interference-as evaluated in real
terms-was "very small"; and (2) there was no evidence that any receivers were in the affected area, the
Bureau's bar against additional entry within the contour of the Grade B signal should be lifted. See
Access Spectrum, LLC Request for Waiver of Section 27.60, 19 F.C.C.R. 15,545, para. 15 (Aug. 12,
2004); see also Report and Order, Second Periodic Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies
Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, 19 F.C.C.R. 18,279, para. 46 n.97 (Sept. 7, 2004)
(setting channel allotment process to allow for additional interference for up to 0.1% of the population
served by adjacent station).
239 See infra Part IV.
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The dispute resolution forum, like a court hearing trespass claims,
should be authorized to award damages and, in special cases, injunctions.
Like the safe harbor model used in statutes like the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"), parties would be immunized from liability
where they complied with the relevant safe harbor requirements.24 The
predictive model that gave rise to those requirements should not be
inviolate; rather, it should only provide a starting point for the enforcement
of property rights in spectrum. In particular, for cases where the model's
predicted level of interference was off by a substantial degree, the injured
party could provide notice to its interfering neighbor (or neighbors) that it
was creating a nontrivial amount of impermissible interference. If the
specified notice period passed without any correction of the illegal
interference (or a negotiated solution), the injured party could bring a claim
for relief. Alternatively, if a party-for whatever reason--did not comply
with the relevant safe harbor requirements and the predictive model closely
mimicked reality, no such notice would be required, and the affected party
could immediately bring a claim for relief.
The rules governing a claim for spectrum trespass, as suggested above,
should be designed to prevent strategic behavior and thus the available
relief should be restricted accordingly. Notably, injunctions that would
curtail a firm's ongoing operations should only be provided upon a showing
that the illegal interference at issue created a material injury to the affected
licensee's business.24' As to damages, a party should be entitled not only to
compensatory damages, but also some form of prescribed damages in cases
where a party presented evidence of a substantial deviation from the
interference authorized by the zoning code and the firm failed to take
effective measures to correct the interference. 42 If firms fail to pay the
required damages or comply with any relevant injunctive order within a
reasonable period of time, they would also be subject to the sanction of
forfeiting their license. Finally, in the event that a firm brought a bad faith
240 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
241 See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Informa-
tion?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 798-800 (2007). In the spectrum context, some commentators have implic-
itly assumed the presence of only damages remedies, but have not explicitly discussed the potential
availability-and potential abuses-of injunctions. See Hazlett, Liberalizing US Spectrum, supra note
78, at 490 ("[P]rivate users' liability for damage will yield efficient incentives to respect other transmis-
sions."); id. at 493 ("Harmful interference could occur, but with full compensation.").
242 Such damages could be on the order of, but not at the high levels of, the statutory damages
provided by copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000) (setting rate for presumed damages for
copyright infringement at a minimum of $750 per infraction and a maximum of $30,000 per infraction).
For non-willful infringement, the measure of damages can be reduced to $200 per infraction (and no
less); for willful infringement, a court may increase the award to no more than $150,000. § 504(c)(2).
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action for spectrum trespass, the licensee subject to the suit would be
entitled to all costs and attorneys' fees as well as punitive damages.243
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW REGULATORY REGIME
Either adhering to the legacy command-and-control model or champi-
oning a property rights regime similar to the one for land dodges many of
the most difficult issues related to developing a system of managing prop-
erty rights for spectrum. In fact, the not-so-hidden secret of the FCC's tradi-
tional spectrum policy regime is that it avoids the very difficult tasks of: (1)
defining property rights clearly enough to allow for marketplace transac-
tions; and (2) instituting an effective enforcement regime. To advance its
spectrum policy reform agenda, the FCC will have to define spectrum rights
and protections against interference (and the correlative right to interfere)
far more clearly than has historically been the case. The implementation of
an improved regime-like the one we proposed in Part III-will raise a
series of challenging questions. In this Part, we address a number of them,
including why such a regime is worth pursuing (as opposed to, say, dedicat-
ing all spectrum to a commons model), what type of institution should su-
perintend the regime we have in mind, and how to encourage Coasian bar-
gaining in a property rights-based system.
A. The Commons Model as an Alternative
Since the outset of this Article, we have avoided discussing one popu-
lar alternative to a system of property rights: the commons model. Advo-
cates of this model can view our basic point-that developing and enforc-
ing property rights in spectrum is more difficult than appreciated by the
conventional wisdom-as an argument to scrap the notion of property
rights altogether. This argument, however, downplays the benefits of the
property rights model and underestimates the challenges that the commons
model faces.
Our view of the debate between property rights and commons ap-
proaches is that both approaches have different advantages and neither
should be pursued to the exclusion of the other. The commons approach
allows spectrum users to avoid gaining access to spectrum via a license (or
a lease of licensed spectrum) and asking permission from the FCC to au-
thorize a particular use.2" As such, we believe that dedicating some swaths
243 This measure parallels one along the lines of the DMCA's penalty for filing a notice and take-
down request in bad faith. See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (concluding that such a penalty was warranted).
244 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 10, at 251-57.
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of spectrum for unlicensed uses, as the FCC has done with some bands (in-
cluding those used for Wi-Fi), is sound policy.
In evaluating the significance of the success of Wi-Fi and the promise
of the commons model for facilitating new technologies, policymakers must
appreciate the fundamental limitations of that approach. The commons
model depends on the FCC's ability to play a critical coordination function
to guard against "tragedy of the commons"-type behavior. To date, the FCC
manages this concern by requiring all commons wireless devices to be low
powered, which lessens the possibility of interference.245 As we have ex-
plained in a prior article, this strategy depends on considerable ongoing
FCC enforcement efforts to be successful and requires greater administra-
tive oversight than is widely appreciated.246
A central virtue of the property rights model is that the recognition of
property rights enables individual licensees to make judgments about what
technologies (and power levels) to use. Moreover, insofar as individual
licensees believe that a commons approach is viable, they are entitled to
create private commons whereby they enforce compliance with whatever
technical or power limitations they impose on the use of the relevant spec-
trum band. Additionally, if a licensee develops an application that is highly
dependent on quality of service guarantees, the licensee-which possesses
enforceable rights as to limitations on interference-is far more likely to
provide reliable service than can be offered using unlicensed spectrum.
Many commons advocates justify their support of unlicensed spectrum
by maintaining that new technologies, which allow dynamic avoidance of
interference, can obviate the need for exclusive control of spectrum via
licenses as a means of managing interference concerns.247 Consequently, as
Ellen Goodman has explained, "[t]he crux of the disagreement between the
two schools [property rights and commons advocates] concerns an empiri-
cal question of whether technological innovation will effectively render
spectrum so abundant that the costs of a private property regime cannot be
defended.""24 In short, the relevant technology has not reached that point, as
it is still in an early period of development without clear indications that it
will successfully address the sorts of concerns that have traditionally cre-
249ated interference issues.
The belief that technologies using commons spectrum likely will radi-
cally outperform those using privately managed spectrum represents a
"Schumpeterian" argument that future innovation will deliver more effec-
245 Jd. at 251-52.
246 Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
663 (2005).
247 See Benkler, supra note 7, at 28.
248 See Goodman, supra note 7, at 380.
249 For a relatively skeptical assessment as to whether these technologies will ever obviate interfer-
ence concerns entirely, see Jackson, supra note 187.
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tive services for consumers than an effective use of spectrum using today's
technologies. 5 We disagree with this claim for two reasons. First, we be-
lieve technologies will not reach this point within the foreseeable future.
Second, even if technologies using commons spectrum would provide far
better uses of spectrum than their property rights counterparts, we are dubi-
ous that the government could manage this spectrum so that these benefits
occur in a reasonably effective and timely manner.
In short, the commons model has much to commend it and we believe
it should be implemented in conjunction with a property rights approach. In
many respects, the two models complement each other and may be more
effective in tandem than in isolation. As Pierre de Vries put it, the two
models may well operate in the "same way that a public park enhances the
market value of surrounding properties, and the use by surrounding resi-
dents increases the utility of the park."25' Notably, commons spectrum pro-
vides a valuable testing ground for technologies that might ultimately be
moved to licensed spectrum. In other cases, such as T-Mobile's new Wi-
Fi/cellular hybrid phone, the two technologies can quite literally work in
tandem.252 We acknowledge the risk that the commons approach could out-
perform the private property model, but betting entirely on that model is
unwise (and politically unrealistic).
B. Back-End Oversight and Institutional Reform
Given the FCC's history of solicitude for rent-seeking behavior by in-
cumbents, an appealing alternative to any reliance on the FCC is to transfer
oversight to courts of general jurisdiction. To that end, one might argue that
generalist courts could have managed the spectrum resource more effec-
tively through property rights developed by judges on a common law basis
from the outset (rather than through a New Deal-chartered regulatory
agency). This argument, however, envisions a far simpler version of spec-
trum property rights and their administration than we proposed in Part 111.253
Given the complex realities of spectrum management and the need for zon-
ing the spectrum, we believe that some specialized administrative oversight
250 This line of argument, named in honor of the late Joseph Schumpeter, places its faith in
"creative destruction" that emerges from technological change and is skeptical of the relative value of
"static" efficiencies that emerge from more efficient uses of existing resources. See JOSEPH
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942).
251 Pierre de Vries, Populating the Vacant Channels: The Case for Allocating Unused Spectrum in
the Digital TV Bands to Unlicensed Use for Broadband and Wireless Innovation 18 (New. Am. Found.,
Working Paper No. 14, 2006), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaperl4.DTV
WhiteSpace.deVries.pdf.
252 See Marguerite Reardon, Switching from Cell to Wi-Fi, Seamlessly, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 7,
2006, http://www.news.com/Switching-from-cell-to-Wi-Fi%2C-seamlessly/2100-1039_36113223.html.
253 Cf Jackson, supra note 189, at 2-9 (criticizing this argument).
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is critical, even if a role for the FCC in spectrum regulation is like what
Winston Churchill said about democracy-it is the worst form of govern-
ment, except for all of the others.254
While administering a property rights system for spectrum, the FCC
(or any oversight agency) 255 will face a number of critical challenges. The
first challenge is to develop a sufficient set of models and a zoning-like
framework to enable spectrum users to develop new technologies and trade
spectrum licenses with the freedom to develop services without first obtain-
ing expensive permission. The second challenge is for the FCC to develop
the expertise to manage adjudications of the kind we describe in Part
III.B.2.
The opportunity to shift the emphasis of spectrum policy from front-
end modeling to back-end (or after-the-fact) oversight, which is an impor-
tant and often overlooked aspect of spectrum policy reform, presents the
FCC with a considerable challenge. As the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task
Force explained, successful spectrum management requires that the "pre-
dictive models used by the Commission [to estimate and manage interfer-
ence] be updated, and perhaps eventually replaced, by techniques that take
into account and assess actual, rather than predicted, interference." '256 By
using and refining such a regime, the FCC can focus on claims of actual
interference-as opposed to relying entirely on a regime that addresses only
the possibility of interference.
Most critically, the FCC must develop the institutional abilities to
function as a "spectrum court" '57 to avoid employing a quasi-legislative
approach to managing spectrum. When criticizing the slow pace of the tran-
sition to a new regulatory regime, commentators routinely downplay the
relevant institutional challenges--often arguing, without any discussion,
that courts can perform this function effectively.5 8 In many respects, the
proponents of generalist courts make an overly harsh judgment about the
possibilities of the devil we know (the flaws of the FCC) versus the one we
do not (the flaws of courts in complex and technical areas).259
254 For a development of this point as to the role of the FCC more generally, see NUECHTERLEIN &
WEISER, supra note 10, at 419-29.
255 As we note here and at the outset, we are agnostic (for present purposes at least) on whether the
administrative agency charged with spectrum management should be a reformed FCC or newly
established administrative agency. For ease of exposition, however, we will refer to such an agency as
the FCC.
256 SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
257 For example, the "spectrum court" could use administrative law judges to decide issues in a
rule-of-law oriented fashion.
258 See PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified
Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEx. L. REv. 863 (2004).
259 See Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Toward a Property Rights Approach to Communications
Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 65 (1999) ("Implementing a property rights system would remove the
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The often unexamined claim that judges should be authorized to
evaluate interference claims between rival licensees overlooks the highly
technical nature of wireless communications. In high technology areas more
generally, commentators such as Judge Posner have highlighted the mis-
match between ordinary judicial tribunals and the technical expertise neces-
sary to judge rival claims; as Posner has explained, "[c]omputer science and
communications technology are much more difficult areas than the average
body of scientific or engineering knowledge that lay judges and jurors are
asked to absorb en route to rendering a decision.""26 One alternative would
be to rely on a system of special masters who could assist judges in such
matters261 and another would be to implement a specialized court system. 62
These are reasonable suggestions, but our preferred alternative is to em-
power a specialized tribunal-say, administrative law judges operating
within the FCC-to consider such claims. 63 Stated simply, we believe that
such a model could more effectively be able to integrate the necessary tech-
nological and policy expertise as well as keep abreast of technological
change.
As an initial matter, the FCC should make available a forum for in-
cumbent users to contest actual interference." 6 By so doing, the FCC can
move away from its sole reliance on front-end models and prophylactic
safeguards. Notably, some recent FCC decisions, such as its Broadband
over Power Line Order, have moved in this very direction, providing for an
after-the-fact complaint procedure to deal with claims of interference that
actually arise.265
ability of politicians to use spectrum allocation for political benefits, and would put a large proportion of
the regulatory staff, not to mention lobbyists and lawyers, out of work."); id. at 65 n.66 ("While it might
increase the workload on judges, it is likely than [sic] many fewer lawyers would be needed to litigate
[the resulting] cases than to navigate the FCC's Byzantine regulations.").
260 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 937 (2001).
261 See Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 259, at 73; see also Posner, supra note 260, at 940; STEPHEN
BREYER, ECONOMIC REASONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-13 (2003), available at http://www.aei.
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=840 (embracing use of experts by judicial tribunals).
262 In the patent system, the Federal Circuit plays this role at the appellate level and Congress
recently commissioned an experiment of training specialized patent judges in each district.
263 See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 246, at 691-94 (discussing advantage of agencies in facilitat-
ing effective use of spectrum commons); Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship ofAntitrust and Regulation
in a Deregulatory Era, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 557-61 (2005) (discussing advantages of regulatory
bodies over antitrust courts).
264 Commissioner Furchtgoff-Roth initially argued for such an approach in 2000. See Service
Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules,
15 F.C.C.R. 476, 557 (Jan. 7, 2000) (separate statement of Furchtgoff-Roth, Comm'r) ("Rather than
creation of so-called 'guard bands,' I would have been inclined to resolve our mandate by establishing
strict interference limits with significant penalties for non-compliance.").
265 See BPL Order, supra note 229, para. 59.
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C. Promoting Technological Progress
When designing property rights for spectrum, we (like other propo-
nents of such a system) envision a baseline property rights system that will
give rise to Coasian bargaining. Unlike many proposals, however, ours does
not view the role of a regulatory authority as antithetical to such a regime.
In particular, we believe that a regulatory authority must play a critical role
because: (1) the system of property rights must rely on a before-the-fact
zoning-like code (based on predictive models); and (2) the adjudication of
after-the-fact judgments (to modify the before-the-fact safe harbor protec-
tion and address noncompliance) will require expertise in radio technology
beyond the capacity of generalist courts. When developing a zoning code
for spectrum, the relevant judgments involve both technical and political
expertise. For example, appreciating that certain types of safe harbors
would make AM radio uneconomical requires technical proficiency; how-
ever, deciding whether society should preserve AM radio is a political
judgment. We caution that policymakers should not, without appreciating
its impact, adopt a property rights system that would wipe out socially
valuable uses of radio technology.
The after-the-fact dispute resolution system we envision would require
the FCC to make two critical kinds of judgments. The first type of judg-
ment, as alluded to above, is defining the baseline property right and safe
harbor protection, presumably privileging certain applications as a result.
Even under such a system, if particular applications (e.g., UHF TV broad-
casting) were less socially valuable and other applications (e.g., wireless
broadband) could produce greater social welfare benefits, the Coase Theo-
rem suggests that such trades would take place. But because transaction
costs (which can be shaped by the system of property rules) may prohibit
effective trading, it is quite possible that the initial property right and its
intended beneficiary (say, AM radio broadcasters) will remain in possession
of the right despite its lower social welfare benefit. This is not necessarily
an anti-Coasian result, but rather reflects the ability of society to place a
thumb on the scale through the development of the entitlement in ques-
tion. 66
The ability of the FCC to set the initial conception of the property right
and alter it over time via a dispute resolution process plays an important
role in facilitating the emergence and adoption of interference management
technologies. 67 To a large degree, firms will internalize the value of adopt-
266 See Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View
from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919, 960-61.
267 Cf Xavier, supra note 18, at 10 ("Interference management techniques are likely to evolve to
accommodate and exploit emerging technologies that have the potential to reduce the impact of the
interference environment. Low-density power technologies like spread spectrum and ultra wideband
systems appear to hold considerable promise in allowing spectrum underlay to be exploited, while
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ing such technologies and will seek to use such technologies to enhance the
value of their spectrum. But, in many cases, the value of such technologies
to a licensee will depend greatly on its neighbor's adoption of interference
mitigation techniques. If, for whatever reason (say, transaction costs or stra-
tegic behavior), Firm A is unwilling to upgrade its interference mitigation
system to benefit a neighbor, its neighbor will presumably be (at least with-
out regulatory action) unable to deploy a more socially valuable product
because the interference that it would produce would subject it to legal ac-
tion.
As an initial strategy, the FCC should rely on private bargaining to al-
low licensees to subsidize the upgrade of their neighboring users' receivers
(or interference mitigation systems). By so doing, the party gaining the
benefit from the interference mitigation will be the one who will pay the
relevant costs. Thus, as in the case of the sparks-producing train and the
farmer's crops planted close to the tracks, the railroad can either pay the
farmer not to plant (thereby authorizing its valuable use) or the farmer
could pay the train to adopt more effective spark mitigation technology
(thereby authorizing his valuable use).26 s In theory, as Coase explained with
regard to that case, clear property rights should give rise to bargaining that
will produce the efficient result.269 Indeed, as to radio technology in particu-
lar, Coase explained that "[t]he reduction of interference on adjacent fre-
quencies may require costly improvements in equipment, and operators on
one frequency could hardly be expected to incur such costs for the benefit
of others if the rights of those operating on adjacent frequencies have not
been determined.
270
Certain scenarios show that the transaction costs inherent in bargaining
can prevent the parties from reaching a mutually beneficial agreement.27' In
the case of unlicensed spectrum, for example, the multitude of parties in-
volved necessitates that the FCC play a more active role in overseeing the
use of such spectrum (as it does through its equipment certification pro-
gram). 72 Similarly, if the number of relevant licensees is large enough,
frequency agility technologies and smart antenna technology offer potential in mitigating interference
concerns.").
268 See Coase, supra note 67, at 15-16.
269 id.
270 Coase, supra note 13, at 28. Similarly, as the Spectrum Policy Task Force Working Group on
Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities noted "[n]ew entrants often complain that incumbents have no
incentive to produce robust systems that are less affected by potential interference and, in fact, have a
disincentive to do so if the Commission continues to protect legacy equipment that is not designed to
operate in a spectrally efficient manner." FCC SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE
SPECTRUM RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 28 (2002), available at http://www.fcc.
gov/sptf/files/SRRWGFinalReport.pdf
271 See Coase, supra note 13, at 26-29.
272 Reflecting this rationale, the FCC took an active stance in its Broadband over Power Line
Decision to facilitate coordination and cooperation between the amateur radio (ham) operators and those
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coordinating their behavior effectively may be difficult. Indeed, it is just
such coordination problems that justify the use of zoning codes in the first
place.
In addition to the coordination (or collective action) problem, three
other types of market failures might justify regulatory involvement through
the development or refinement of a zoning code. First, incumbents may
withhold their cooperation to engage in holdup-type behavior. Second, in-
cumbents may refuse to cooperate when the benefiting party is developing a
disruptive technology that will ultimately undermine the incumbent's core
business. Third, governmental agencies that own rights to spectrum may not
act rationally, because they are not motivated by economic incentives (i.e.,
they are not allowed to monetize their spectrum).
First, the law and economics literature has clearly established that the
incentive for parties to withhold cooperation for strategic reasons can un-
dermine socially beneficial transactions.273 In the case of telecommunica-
tions regulation, this theory (among others) explains the need for mandatory
interconnection with an incumbent's network and an open interface to fa-
cilitate competition in equipment manufacturing.274 If all entrants in the
telecommunications service or equipment manufacturing markets could be
"held up" from deploying a new service or product until the incumbent vol-
untarily agreed to afford it access and interconnection to its network, those
entrants would be placed at a formidable and likely insurmountable disad-
vantage.
The second form of a transaction cost is that incumbent providers will
often fail to embrace the promise of "disruptive technologies" '275 and will
seek to prevent their introduction into the marketplace. In the case of
AT&T, for example, it initially refused to deploy fiber optic technology in
its network, explaining that it intended to stick with its legacy infrastructure
which it would be able to depreciate until the late 1990s. But once the gov-
ernment forced AT&T (or, more precisely, its divested Bell Operating
Companies) to interconnect with rivals like MCI, it could not sit idly by
while rivals embraced the disruptive technology.276
deploying broadband over power lines systems. See BPL Order, supra note 229, para. 83 (imposing
BPL notification and database requirements on BPL operators).
273 For the classic development of the legal responses to holdout and the development of the
Coasian analysis, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also Lemley & Weiser,
supra note 241, at 784.
274 See Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier In Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN L. REV. (forthcoming
2008).
275 This concept is developed in CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA (1997).
276 See Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technologies in U.S.
Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 107 (explaining that AT&T failed to deploy fiber optic
technology in its long-haul network until Sprint and other upstarts did and began advertising a superior
quality network). As an executive from Coming explained:
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In situations where holdup opportunities or the fear of disruptive tech-
nologies lead incumbents to withhold cooperation, the FCC should be will-
ing to mandate an arrangement that would call for coordination between the
affected parties. As Coase argued, the role of government in such situations
is to identify and institute the solution that "would have been achieved if
the institution of private property and the pricing mechanism were working
well." '277 By calling for a notice and negotiation process before a party seeks
FCC dispute resolution, our system of property rights would encourage
private resolution. We recognize, however, that parties may fail to resolve
such disputes and the FCC will need to redefine property rights to facilitate
technological change.27
When exercising its power to modify the relevant zoning code, the
FCC should recognize that it can mandate creative remedies to promote
technological progress and the more efficient use of spectrum.279 Consider
the case of a service that relies on technologically antiquated equipment
where the interference-or its likelihood given a requested change in the
allowable levels of radio energy at the relevant boundary--could be sub-
stantially lessened with relative ease by upgrading equipment.28 ° Reflecting
AT&T, which owned most of the telephone lines in America at the time [of the invention of
fiber optic technology], said it would be 30 years before its telephone system would be ready
for optical fiber. And when it was, AT&T planned to make its own fiber.... [After AT&T
entered into a consent decree,] MCI took the risk [of ordering fiber optic technology] and
placed a 100,000 kilometer order for a new generation of fiber.
Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to a
Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 202 (1997) (quoting Telecommunications: The Role of the
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 125-26 (1995)
(statement of Timothy J. Regan, Division Vice President and Director of Public Policy, Coming, Inc.)).
277 Coase, supra note 13, at 29.
278 Notably, the courts have endorsed such measures, making clear that licensees are only entitled
to protection from harmful interference and that speculative claims of interference do not suffice to
challenge FCC decisions that purportedly impinge on a licensee's rights. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.
v. FCC, 270 F.3d 959, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming in relevant part AirCell, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R.
9622 (2000)); AMSC Subsidiary Corp. v. FCC, 216 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
279 This authority is one currently wielded by administrative bodies in the water rights context. See
Freyfogle, supra note 22, at 1541-42.
280 This measure would be in line with the widely recognized point that receiver technology is a
critical constraint on facilitating the more effective use of spectrum. See Notice of Inquiry, Interference
Immunity Performance Specifications for Radio Receivers, 18 F.C.C.R. 6039, para. 10 (Mar. 24, 2003)
(emphasizing the importance of receiver performance with reference to efficient use of spectrum); FCC
SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE INTERFERENCE PROTECTION WORKING GROUP 25
(2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/IPWGFinalReport.pdf ("The Working Group believes
that receiver reception factors, including sensitivity, selectivity, and interference tolerance, need to play
a prominent role in spectrum policy."); Powell, supra note 84, at 3 ("[I]nterference is often more a
product of receivers; that is, receivers are too dumb or too sensitive or too cheap to filter out unwanted
signals. Yet, our decades-old rules have generally ignored receivers."); see also FED. GOV'T SPECTRUM
TASK FORCE, SPECTRUM POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (2004), available at http://www.ntia.doc.
gov/reports/specpolini/presspepolinimreportl_06242004.htm (suggesting appropriateness of consider-
2008] SPECTRUM POLICY REFORM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
this point, the FCC might determine that the old analog TV sets, which are
more sensitive to interference than their newer digital TV counterparts, are
no longer the appropriate baseline against which to measure possible inter-
ference. 2 ' This step would both create more usable spectrum (i.e., by limit-
ing the possibility of harmful interference caused by sensitive receivers and
allowing removal of buffer areas) and pressure owners of analog TVs re-
ceiving over-the-air reception to upgrade to digital TVs.
The easiest case is the one where the parties can negotiate a mutually
beneficial arrangement that allows new entry into the market based on
equipment upgrades.282 The FCC, however, is likely to face challenging
cases where the parties fail to agree. In some cases, such as where transac-
tion costs (or other obstacles) prevent such arrangements, the FCC should
consider requiring the entrant to subsidize such upgrades. 283 Alternatively,
if the agency believes that the use of ineffective receivers is unjustifiable
(such as in the analog TV example noted above), it can raise the baseline of
interference protection to require more robust receivers, therefore placing
the burden on the party with poor equipment to pay for an upgrade. 284 Fi-
nally, in the case of government users, which may be particularly obstinate
ing whether incumbents should be obligated to "deploy more robust equipment as they replace existing
equipment").
281 Comments of New America Foundation Before FCC, Unlicensed Operation in the TV
Broadcast Bands, ET Docket 04-186 (January 31, 2007), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/publica
tions/resources/2007/final results ofuniversity of~kansas tv white space interference-study (noting
that analog TV receivers are more sensitive to interference than their digital TV counterparts).
282 For such cases, less than perfect FCC oversight, (as is likely to be the case given the
considerable difficulties in creating and calibrating property rights in spectrum), may well encourage
parties to bargain more effectively. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1095-96 (1995) (arguing that
where each party has a probable claim to the same entitlement, muddy defaults facilitate bargaining
when parties cannot predict ex ante which of them will win in litigation).
283 This form of relief, which in effect concludes that an incumbent licensee is preventing socially
valuable uses of spectrum and should be subsidized to allow that new use, is a variant of Calabresi &
Melamed's famous Rule 4. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 273, at 1115-24; see also Spur Indus.,
Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). It is also increasingly used in the water
rights context. See Freyfogle, supra note 22, at 1542. In implementing such a program, however, the
FCC should oversee it carefully so that the incumbent does not, among other things, unduly delay im-
plementing the technological upgrade, overspend on such upgrades as a strategic step to raise the costs
of a rival, or use the subsidy to support unrelated objectives.
284 A study commissioned by Ofcom, the UK regulator, explained the implications of this point:
It is important to note that the minimum receiver performance is not meant to be mandated. It
serves as a benchmark with which the interference environment can be assessed. If an opera-
tor chooses to use receivers having a performance in some way inferior to the minimum re-
ceiver performance, then they will not be protected from interference levels higher than those
used for the assessment. They may however choose to negotiate with a neighbour to reduce
the neighbour's emissions such that their inferior receivers operate satisfactorily.
/EGIS SPECTRUM ENG'G, SPECTRUM USAGE RIGHTS: OFCOM, FINAL REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/sur/spectrum/summary.pdf.
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because they are not necessarily motivated by financial incentives, the
FCC's role in brokering arrangements that facilitate more effective uses of
spectrum is particularly important.
CONCLUSION
The New Deal optimism about the effectiveness of command-and-
control regulation has generally given way to market-based reforms. The
legacy model of spectrum regulation, however, remains stubbornly in place.
In part, entrenched interests and regulatory inertia explain this resistance to
reform. But another critical factor is that instituting property rights in spec-
trum is not as simple as transposing existing real property rules for trespass
onto spectrum licenses. To be sure, more effective uses of spectrum might
emerge over time as judges defined property rules for spectrum in a com-
mon law-like fashion as they did for water rights (say, providing for a lim-
ited use of injunctions and money damages only after the relevant harm
already occurred). 5 Such an approach, however, would be suboptimal be-
cause it would not prevent an avoidable harm (preventable interference and
huge societal and economic disruptions) that could be managed through a
zoning-like system and the transition to a property rights model envisioned
by our proposal.
Both our proposal and ones calling for an increased role for courts in
managing property rights in spectrum rely on Coase's vision of promoting a
market for spectrum licenses. We criticize the conventional view of spec-
trum property rights, however, on the ground that defining rights to use
spectrum is far more difficult than ordinarily suggested and allowing courts
to manage the development and enforcement of such rights is a riskier
proposition than generally appreciated by spectrum property rights advo-
cates. In this regard, the case study of cellular services, which have unique
characteristics, is misleading insofar as commentators have suggested that
this precedent establishes that property rights in spectrum will be easy to
manage. Thus, in lieu of a unitary property rights model based on the cellu-
lar precedent, we propose a zoned system of property rights that relies on
both before-the-fact predictive models and after-the-fact oversight. To be
sure, an essential predicate for this vision is the ability of a reformed FCC
or a new administrative agency to manage a new system of spectrum regu-
lation. On this point, we are well aware of and readily acknowledge the
public choice risks that inhere in our proposal, but we are nonetheless skep-
285 Hazlett, for example, appears to assume that licensees violating tolerable interference limits
would be free to cause such harm and pay the applicable damage remedy if that were an economically
efficient choice. See Hazlett, supra note 78, at 490 ("[P]rivate users' liability for damage will yield
efficient incentives to respect other transmissions.").
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tical that judges can manage a system of spectrum property rights more
effectively than their administrative agency counterparts.
The conventional wisdom that the command-and-control system of
spectrum management must be reformed to provide property rights in spec-
trum along the model used in the cellular bands has yet to give way to a
debate focused on the real challenges of developing and enforcing property
rights in spectrum. As we explain, a careful appreciation for how such a
system would operate in practice requires an understanding of the predic-
tive nature of the models used to develop the relevant boundaries for spec-
trum rights and how levels of allowable interference could be incorpo-
rated-based on creating safe harbors from liability-into a property-based
system. As we envision it, such a system calls for after-the-fact refinements
that will require familiarity with the overall system, how radio technology
operates, and the practical impact of the requested relief.
If implemented properly, a reformed system of spectrum regulation
would create incentives for users to coordinate with each other to avoid
interference and make any reasonable accommodations to ensure that each
service continues to work effectively. Ultimately, however, such a system
will also require the FCC to make judgments based on relevant technical
and societal realities as to what types of spectrum rights should be pro-
tected. Significantly, by specifying such judgments in advance through pre-
defined property rights (as opposed to defining them on a purely case-by-
case basis), the FCC can end its traditional reliance on overly restrictive
protections that "retards entry and innovation and favors incumbents." '286
We have no illusions that the transition to a new model of regulation will be
easy, but we believe that the merits of this model are far superior to our
current system, and that, sooner or later, some version of it will be adopted.
After all, the alternative is that the recently auctioned off swaths in the 700
MHz band of spectrum-which were eagerly sought by a variety of firms-
will truly be the last great opportunity to obtain new spectrum for higher
value uses than many of today's incumbent services.
286 Gregory L. Rosston, The Long and Winding Road: The FCC Paves the Path with Good
Intentions, 27 TELECOMMS. POL'Y 501, 511 (2003), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/01-
08.pdf (suggesting increased back end adjudication to guard against interference).
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